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TAX LAW UNCERTAINTY AND THE ROLE OF
TAX INSURANCE

Kyle D. Logue·
In the broadest sense, this is an article about legal or regulatory
uncertainty and the role that private and public insurance can play in
managing it. More narrowly, the article is about tax law enforcement
and the familiar if ill-defined distinctions between tax evasion, tax
avoidance, and abusive tax avoidance. Most specifically, the article is
about a new type of tax risk insurance policy, sometimes called tax
indemnity insurance or transactional tax risk insurance that provides
coverage against the risk that the Internal Revenue Service (Service)
will disallow a taxpayer-insured's tax treatment of a particular
transaction. The question is whether this type of insurance coverage
increases incentives for illegitimate tax avoidance or, alternatively,
provides needed certainty to taxpayers - certainty that the Service is
not able or willing to provide. Should tax insurance be banned?
Encouraged? Ignored? To what extent should the government, instead
of commercial insurance companies, provide such legal uncertainty
insurance directly, either by increasing the use of private rulings or by
selling the equivalent of tax indemnity insurance policies? On the
question of commercially provided tax indemnity insurance, the article
concludes that the appropriate regulatory response is probably (a) to
allow the purchase of policies (and perhaps in some situations to
subsidize their purchase) but (b) to compel taxpayers who purchase
Professor of Law, University of Michigan. My thanks to Reuven Avi-Yonah,
Steven Bank, Victor Fleischer, Jason Furman, David Hasen, Ed Kleinbard, Daniel
Shaviro, Joel Slemrod, Kirk Stark and the participants at the NYU Colloquium on
Tax Policy and Public Finance, the UCLA Tax Policy and Public Finance Workshop,
and the University of Virginia Legal Theory Workshop for extremely useful
comments on earlier drafts of this paper. Funding for this research was generously
provided by the Cook Fund at the University of Michigan Law School, and much of
the work on the article was completed while I was in residence at the University of
Virginia School of Law.
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such policies to disclose this fact to the Service. Such a response allows
the use of tax risk insurance as a supplement to private letter rulings
while at the same time minimizing the possibility that the insurance will
be sold to cover pure "detection risk."
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INTRODUCTION

Consider the following hypothetical transactions and the tax law
uncertainty that each contains: 1
Example One: Ms. A is contemplating making a sizeable
investment in an existing partnership. In the course of her
due diligence investigation, Ms. A discovers a large potential
tax issue. Ms. A's tax advisor tells her that if the Service
detects and raises the issue on audit, she would probably
prevail in court, but that a favorable outcome is not certain.
The law in question is not crystal clear in its application to the
particular circumstances of this partnership, and thus there is
some significant possibility of losing on the merits if it comes
to that. Moreover, if the issue is detected and raised by the
Service, the cost of litigating the question will be substantial.
Because of these uncertain contingencies, Ms. A is reluctant
to proceed.
Example Two: B Corp, a publicly traded corporation, would
like to spin off its subsidiary C to B's shareholders for nontax
business reasons. However, C is a very valuable company,
and B's basis in C's stock is low; therefore, B would, if
possible, like to structure the transaction to qualify as a tax
free spin-off under Internal Revenue Code (Code) section
355. The problem is that there is some risk the Service (and
in turn a court) will conclude that the transaction was not in
fact motivated primarily by a nontax business purpose but
was rather a mere device for avoiding taxes and will thus
disallow the tax-free treatment. If that were to happen, B
would incur a huge tax liability from the capital gain on the
transaction. To resolve this legal uncertainty, B sought a
private letter ruling from the Service that the spin-off would
qualify under section 355, but the Service refused to issue the
requested ruling because the question of whether B has a
nontax business purpose for the spin-off is too "fact
intensive." B's outside tax counsel has provided a legal
opinion confirming that the transaction should qualify for tax1 The first four hypotheticals are taken from an article about tax indemnity
insurance by a tax practitioner. See generally Richard A. Wolfe, Tax Indemnity
Insurance: A Valuable and Evolving Tool for Managing Tax Risks, 598 PLl!fAX 595,
604-16 (2003).
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free treatment; this opinion reduces almost to zero the
likelihood of penalties should the Service disagree. However,
given the magnitude of the corporate-level gain involved, B is
nevertheless reluctant to go forward with the deal.
Example Three: D Corp is a holding company that owns a
number of subsidiary corporations, including T Corp, which
happens to be D 's only profitable operation at the moment.
D is in dire financial straits and needs to raise capital to
survive. Accordingly, D decides to sell T to the highest
bidder. P is interested in buying T from D; in the course of
conducting its due diligence, however, P discovers that D has
a significant potential federal income tax issue unrelated to T,
an issue that involves hundreds of millions of federal tax
dollars that has not yet been detected by the Service.
Although P's tax counsel is of the view that D's position with
respect to this tax issue is probably correct on the merits,
there is considerable uncertainty on this point, and the
Service (and a court) might well take a less favorable view. P
is concerned that (i) the issue may well be detected and D's
reporting position will be rejected by the Service; (ii) if
detected, there is some nontrivial possibility that the
government will prevail; and (iii) if the government were to
prevail, D, because of its dire financial position, might not be
able to satisfy the taxes that would arise, potentially leaving T
on the hook for the taxes under the consolidated return
regulations.2
Example Four: E Corp is a publicly traded corporation that is
currently being audited by the Service. Indeed, like many
large corporations, E is virtually under constant audit. The
Service agents have indicated to E that they are considering
issuing a thirty-day letter with respect to a significant tax issue
involving E's return. E believes the agents' position has
limited merit, but E is aware that if the agents issue the thirty
day letter, because of the magnitude of the potential tax, E
will have to publicly disclose that fact and establish an
accounting reserve for the potential tax liability. P is
concerned that this disclosure will adversely affect its share
price.

2

See Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-6 (2002).

2005]

Tax Law Uncertainty and Tax Insurance

343

These examples represent a much larger phenomenon:
sophisticated taxpayers who are considering engaging in some sort of
business transaction but face substantial uncertainty as to how the tax
laws will be applied to their particular transaction. It is easy to
understand how such uncertainty might deter a risk-averse taxpayer
from engaging in welfare-enhancing, wealth-creating transactions,
which would obviously be a bad thing, especially if the uncertainty in
question could feasibly be eliminated or reduced. One might surmise
that the natural solution to the problem of tax law uncertainty would
be for the government - either Congress or the Treasury
Department - to clarify the law in advance so that such uncertainty
does not exist. It simply is not possible, however, to eliminate
substantive tax law uncertainty for every conceivable business
transaction. No matter how long and detailed the tax laws become
(and they presently span over 10,000 pages of code and regulations),
there will always be gaps; there will always be transactions or activities
whose proper tax treatment is uncertain. Another solution might be
to have the government on a case-by-case basis provide insurance
against tax law uncertainty in the form of private letter rulings issued
directly to taxpayers - in effect, guaranteeing with some limitations a
particular tax treatment for a particular transaction. As it turns out,
however, the Service is not always willing or able to provide such
individualized assurance.
A final alternative is the one on which this Article focuses:
privately provided tax risk insurance.3 In recent years, insurance
companies have begun to offer tax risk insurance policies - also
called tax indemnity insurance policies (TIIPs) or transactional tax
risk insurance - that provide taxpayers with coverage against the risk
that the Service will reject a taxpayer's characterization of a particular
transaction. These policies usually provide full indemnification for all
tax-related losses, including back taxes, interest, and penalties. What
sorts of tax risks can be insured against? Situations like the examples
mentioned above have each been the basis of a tax risk insurance
policy, as have many others.4 More importantly, the theoretical scope
of tax risk insurance is large as is the potential market for regulatory
uncertainty insurance more generally. For insurance markets to
operate there need only be a significant amount of money at stake
coupled with a significant amount of uncertainty. Thus, although tax

3 Tax insurance goes by various names: tax liability insurance, tax indemnity
insurance, and tax risk transactional insurance, to name a few.
4 See Wolfe, supra note 1, at 604-06.
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risk insurance is a recent development and is still only a niche market
compared with the enormous market for commercial general liability
insurance or professional malpractice insurance, and although it has
not yet spread to other, nontax areas of regulatory uncertainty, it is
not surprising to hear that there are reports that the tax indemnity
5
insurance market is growing rapidly. It is only a matter of time
before insurers begin considering nontax applications of regulatory
uncertainty insurance.
Interestingly, a decent argument can be made that there is
nothing special, and nothing especially troublesome, about privately
provided tax liability insurance, or regulatory uncertainty insurance
more generally. The type of risk-shifting that occurs through a tax
risk insurance policy is merely a natural extension of a type of
contractual risk-shifting that has existed for a long time without much
controversy: tax indemnity or tax allocation agreements between
contracting parties. Such agreements, which are frequently, if not
always, a part of corporate merger and acquisition transactions,
regularly serve to allocate uncertain tax liabilities between or among
the parties. For example, a tax indemnity agreement might shift a
potential tax liability from a purchaser to a seller or vice versa. These
indemnity agreements presumably shift the relevant legal risks to the
less risk-averse party to the transaction. In any event, since tax
indemnity agreements have existed for a while, the introduction of tax
risk insurance marks a sort of natural evolution of tax indemnity
agreements. With the introduction of this new insurance market, if
one of the parties is risk-averse with respect to a tax law contingency
involved in the deal, instead of just shifting the tax law uncertainty
from buyer to seller or vice versa, that legal uncertainty can be moved
from the contracting parties to a third-party insurance company whose
business is assessing and distributing risks and who can therefore do
so relatively efficiently. Viewed this way, tax risk insurance would
seem to be neither more nor less objectionable than any other form of
commercial liability insurance and should be left alone, or perhaps
'
even encouraged in some way.
There is, however, a less optimistic way to view tax risk insurance.
To see this concern, imagine a final hypothetical:

5 See, e.g. , Kenneth A. Gary, New Opportunity for Tax Lawyers: Insuring Tax
Transactions, 104 TAX NOTES 26 (July 5, 2004) (describing the rapid recent growth of
the tax insurance market).
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Example Five: F Corp is a public corporation that is currently
highly profitable but faces intense competition. F's chief
executive officer (CEO) is continually under extreme
pressure from shareholders, and from the capital markets
generally, to increase after-tax earnings, and the pressure
travels downstream. Every department in the corporation,
including (somewhat counterintuitively) the tax department,
is being urged to "deliver greater profits." For the past
several years, F has paid large amounts of federal income tax
to the government, to the chagrin of the CEO and
shareholders. F's tax manager is fe eling the heat and
wondering whether his job with the company is secure. Then
he is approached by XYZ Firm, an accounting/law firm that
specializes in developing, marketing, implementing, and
ultimately defending highly sophisticated tax shelter products.
XYZ says it has a new shelter to offer F that relies on an
ingeniously counterintuitive but literally plausible reading of
several different provisions of the Code. According to XYZ,
merely by engaging in a series of complicated transactions
that have little real (i.e., nontax) economic significance and
that involve an accommodating foreign corporation that is not
subject to U.S. tax laws but is willing to assist for a price, F
can in effect manufacture paper losses that will substantially
reduce the company's U.S. corporate income tax liability.
The catch is that, if this shelter is detected by the Service on
audit, which is unlikely given the complexity of the
transaction but nevertheless possible, the Service will
certainly regard the transaction as a sham or as lacking
significant nontax economic substance. Although a court may
be persuaded to overturn the Service's determination and
side with the taxpayer, the more likely outcome is that a court
would side with the government given that the shelter in
question relies on an interpretation of the law that is clearly
contrary to congressional intent. In any event, the cost of
litigating the case would be immense. Moreover, because of
the aggressive nature of the tax position being recommended,
large tax penalties are a possibility, despite the presence of a
"more likely than not" opinion from a reputable tax counsel,
assuming such an opinion can be secured. Given all of these
uncertainties, F is reluctant to purchase the shelter product.
This hypothetical should be familiar to the readers of this journal
and to anyone who has followed the problem of corporate tax shelters
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in the tax and business presses. As has been well documented,
sophisticated taxpayers confront powerful incentives to engage in
what are sometimes called "abusive tax shelter" transactions.6 Indeed,
the prevalence of abusive tax shelters, with the associated costs in
terms of behavioral distortions and distributional inequities, is widely
considered one of the most serious problems facing the administration
of the income tax laws and is certainly one of the most written about
topics in all of tax scholarship.7 The tax shelter problem will, in all
likelihood, never go away entirely. So long as (i) there is a low
probability that abusive shelters will be detected on audit, which
seems likely always to be true; (ii) sophisticated taxpayers have the
ability to avoid paying penalties by simply purchasing an appropriate
opinion letter, or "penalty insurance," from a willing tax lawyer; and
(iii) the penalties that are assessed in those cases in which the opinion
letters are unavailing are relatively small, as has always been true,
there will likely be a healthy market for tax shelters. If we add to this
equation the possibility that even the small residual risk of incurring
tax penalties might be entirely eliminated through the purchase of a
tax risk insurance policy, a dramatically larger tax compliance
problem potentially emerges.
To see this point, imagine what would happen if XYZ Firm in
Example Five above were to offer the following option with its new
shelter product: If F Corp would agree to purchase and implement
XYZ's newest shelter, XYZ would broker a deal with InsureCo to
underwrite F's risk of having to pay back taxes, interest, and penalties
in the event the shelter is discovered and rejected. Moreover,
lnsureCo would also agree to cover the litigation costs to defend the
shelter against the Service. F would need only to pay the insurance
premium and agree to the terms in the contract. If such insurance
6

The term "abusive tax shelter" is notoriously difficult to define. Unless
otherwise specified, I use the term loosely to mean transactions that are primarily tax
motivated and that rely for their tax advantages on a reading of the tax laws that is (a)
technically legal (that is, not obviously illegal) but (b) more likely than not to be
rejected by a court if examined on the merits. Many other definitions of tax shelters
have been offered, some broader and some narrower than the one just stated. Some
of these other definitions are mentioned below.
7 See, e.g. , Joseph Bankman, The New Market in Corporate Tax Shelters, 83 TAX
NOTES 1775 (June 21, 1999); Foreword: Symposium on Corporate Tax Shelters, 55
TAX L. REV. 125, 125 (2002) ("In the tax community there is general (although not
unanimous) agreement that corporate tax shelters pose a threat to the federal income
tax system."); U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, THE PROBLEM OF CORPORATE TAX
SHELTERS: DISCUSSION, ANALYSIS AND LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS (1999), available at
http://www .treas.gov/press/releases/reports/ctswhite.pdf.
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were available, it would almost certainly be socially undesirable.
Unlike insurance against legitimate legal uncertainty ( that is,
uncertainty as to how the law will be applied to particular situations) ,8
this would be insurance against pure detection risk - that is, the risk
of being caught - since the legal position being taken here is almost
certainly not legal. The last thing we need is a new financial product
that enables highly aggressive taxpayers to shift their risk of being
detected to a risk-neutral insurer. Thus, although the tax indemnity
insurance market may currently be a small scale operation in contrast
to some other types of insurance, and may even presently be limited
to transactions that do involve significant legal uncertainty, the
market could expand or mutate to produce insurance policies that
cover tax shelter transactions as well, thereby making an already
difficult tax compliance problem far worse. This concern is not purely
academic. There has already been some regulatory scrutiny directed
at tax insurance arrangements precisely because of the concern about
shelter insurance. For example, the Treasury Department considered
but ultimately rejected making the purchase of a tax indemnity
insurance policy sufficient grounds for triggering the tax shelter
reporting requirement, which would have brought enhanced Service
scrutiny on insured tax positions.9
So which picture of tax risk insurance - the optimistic or the
pessimistic one - is more accurate? Is tax insurance good or bad? It
turns out that the best answer is that it depends. Under certain
assumptions, a surprisingly strong case can be made for allowing 8 Another term for substantive legal uncertainty in the tax context is "merits
risk," as in the risk of losing the issue "on the merits" in the event that it is examined
by a court.
9 Treas.
Reg. § l.6011-4(b)(4) (2004) (defining one class of "reportable
transactions" - i.e., transactions that trigger special reporting requirements for the
taxpayer - as those with "contractual protection" regarding the tax position in
question, where "contractual protection" includes transactions with respect to which
the taxpayer has secured a tax insurance policy). This language in the temporary
regulations caused a stir among insurance companies who were concerned that
making the purchase of tax insurance a trigger for tax-shelter reporting would prevent
this fledgling insurance market from ever getting off the ground. See, e.g. , David S.
De Berry, Insurance Group Comments on Tax Shelter Reporting Regs, TAX NOTES
TODAY (Jan. 6, 2003) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2003 TNT 3-57)
[hereinafter Insurance Group Comments] (comments of Dave De Berry of The
Hartford Company, urging the Treasury Department to change proposed regulations
to exclude the purchase of tax insurance as sufficient to trigger shelter-reporting
requirements). The temporary regulation was superseded by a final set of regulations
in T.D. 9046, 2003-1 C.B. 614, which still contains the contractual protection category
of reportable transactions, but which omits any mention of tax insurance.
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even encouraging - tax insurance, which as a form of insurance has
much in common with run-of-the-mill liability or legal risk insurance.
There is no denying, however, the danger inherent in this type of
insurance. It is possible that the sort of tax indemnity insurance for
run-of-the-mill corporate transactions, which we see now, could
evolve into something else, something more like insurance against
abusive tax positions or overly aggressive interpretations of the tax
laws. Therefore, the interesting questions are how likely is that
possibility, what can be done to prevent it, and whether, on balance,
tax risk insurance ought to be considered a socially beneficial - or at
least benign - development, or whether it should be discouraged or
banned altogether. This Article addresses these questions. A related
question, which will not be the focus of this Article but which the
analysis of this Article raises, is whether there might be a legitimate
role for private insurance in other contexts of regulatory legal
uncertainty.
Part II begins with a description of the general problem of tax law
enforcement; the blurry distinction between tax evasion and tax
avoidance; and the link between those concepts, the rules/standards
debate, the concept of legal uncertainty, and the market for tax risk
insurance. Part III then describes what I call the "old markets" in tax
insurance, which consist of (a) the use of tax indemnity agreements in
corporate merger and acquisition transactions and (b) the widespread
and uncontroversial phenomenon of warranties or guarantees issued
by tax preparation firms to individual and small business taxpayers.
Part III also briefly discusses what I call tax advisor warranties that
tum out to have essentially the same structure as contingent fee
arrangements for tax advice and, in the view of the Treasury
Department, do raise enforcement concerns. Part IV, the meat of the
Article, provides a somewhat more detailed description of the new tax
indemnity insurance market and the factors that seem to give rise to it.
Part IV also gives fuller voice to the worries that one might have
concerning a market for tax insurance given the already serious
deterrence problems in the area of corporate tax enforcement. This
Part also explains in greater detail the somewhat surprising case in
favor of allowing or even subsidizing the use of tax insurance in
certain settings and explores whether there is any significant
difference between tax indemnity insurance and commercial liability
insurance such that the former ought to be restricted or banned
whereas the latter is not only allowed but encouraged. It also outlines
a possible disclosure solution that tax policymakers might adopt to
minimize the dangers and maximize the advantages of tax indemnity

2005)

Tax Law Uncertainty and Tax Insurance

349

insurance - that is, to minimize the possibility that it will be used to
cover only detection risk. Finally, Part IV briefly considers an
alternative to commercially provided legal uncertainty insurance:
government provided legal uncertainty insurance - either through
the increased use of private letter rulings or, more interestingly, the
introduction of government provided tax liability insurance. Either
approach has advantages and disadvantages, which I discuss below.
II.

EVASION AND AVOIDANCE, RULES AND STANDARDS, AND THE
PROBLEM OF LEGAL UNCERTAINTY

A. An Introductory Note on Tax Noncompliance
There is a sense in which tax compliance is a permanent problem.
As with the enforcement of any law that imposes burdens on
individuals for the collective good, there will always be incentives for
free riding. What this means in the tax context is that taxpayers,
individual and corporate, will always have an incentive to minimize
their own tax liabilities while continuing to take full advantage of the
benefits of government expenditures. 10 A corollary of this fact is that
in the absence of government imposed penalties for noncompliance,
our practice of funding government expenditures through tax
revenues would be highly problematic.
At the heart of this
conventional view is the classical deterrence model of tax law, which
10

The so-called "tax gap" is the Service's effort to estimate the overall shortfall
in federal tax dollars due to noncompliance. That is, the tax gap measures the
difference between how much in federal taxes ought to have been paid for a
particular tax year and how much was actually paid. The first number has historically
been calculated using a complicated set of formulas and inputting data from the old
Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP), which was carried throughout
the 1970s and 1980s but which ended in 1995. The latter number is taken from
estimated and actual tax collections. See generally JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA,
TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO THE DEBATE OVER T AXES 1 74-76 (3d ed.
2004) (explaining the tax gap calculation). Since 2001, tax gap data have been
gathered under the new, less ambitious, but less intrusive National Research Program.
But those data have not yet been analyzed. The tax gap consists of three components:
underreporting of income (e.g., excessive deductions, underreported income, and the
like), nonfiling, and underpayment of stated liabilities. It is the underreporting figure
that constitutes the lion's share of the tax gap and that presents the largest tax
compliance problem.
According to TCMP data from the 1970s and 1980s
extrapolated to the 2001 tax year, underreporting is estimated to be around 13.8
percent for individual taxpayers and 1 7.4 percent for corporations. Joel Slemrod, The
Economics of Corporate Tax Selfishness (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 10858, 2004), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w10858.
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says that taxpayers rationally respond to incentives including formal
tax penalties. 11 This is not to say, of course, that informal sanctions
such as social norms play no role in encouraging tax compliance, nor
that tax compliance would be nonexistent in the absence of sanctions.
To the contrary, there is evidence that taxpayers, at least corporate
and self-employed taxpayers, voluntarily pay more in taxes than
formal deterrence models would predict. 12 In fact, given how many
individuals and firms do pay their taxes, it seems reasonable to assume
either that there is some degree of cognitive failure, such as
overestimation of the likelihood of detection, or perhaps
altruism/patriotism on the part of taxpayers. Perhaps the informal
sanctions taxpayers face, such as the reputational costs of being
labeled a "tax cheat," are a more significant deterrent than one might
initially think. 13 Still, few doubt that the traditional deterrence factors
11

The seminal statement of this Beckeresque view of tax law is found in Michael
G. Allingham & Agnar Sandmo, Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis, 1 J.
PUB. ECON. 323 (1972). Under the Allingham/Sandmo model, taxpayers seek to
minimize their tax payment, taking into account only the obvious deterrence variables
such as the probability of detection, size of the penalty, tax rate, actual income, and
the like.
12
This phenomenon has inspired some scholars to assert that U.S. taxpayers are
"pathologically honest," in the sense that they pay more in taxes than the standard
deterrence (Allingham/Sandmo) model would suggest. It is almost as if taxpayers are,
in effect, making a "gift" to the government. Joel Slemrod, Trust in Public Finance
(Nat'! Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9187, 2002), available at
http://www .nber.org/papers/w9187. As Joel Slemrod points out, however, this
argument is often overstated, insofar as it fails to recognize that, with many individual
taxpayers, especially those whose primary source of income is in the form of wages,
the level of compliance is very high, just as the traditional deterrence model would
predict. This fact seems to be due, in large part, to the role of information returns,
which the Service can easily cross-reference with tax returns. Id. Still, with respect to
the corporate income tax, as well as with respect to some forms of individual income,
such as self-employment income, the well-documented opportunities for undetectable
evasion are so plentiful that the traditional model, narrowly construed, clearly does
not provide the full explanation.
13 See
generally WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES: TAX COMPLIANCE AND
ENFORCEMENT (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992) (containing empirical studies of the role of
social norms and morality on compliance); James Andreoni, Brian Erard & Jonathan
Feinstein, Tax Compliance, 36 J. ECON. LIT. 818, 850 (1998) (discussing literature on
the effect of morality and social norms on tax compliance). It is also possible that,
with respect to some taxpayers and some types of tax compliance, formal and
informal sanctions, or extrinsic and intrinsic sanctions, work not as complements to
but as substitutes for each other, such that increasing the formal penalties for tax
noncompliance could actually reduce compliance by "crowding out" intrinsic or moral
motivations to comply. See Bruno S. Frey, A Constitution for Knaves Crowds Out
Civic Virtues, 107 ECON. J. 1043 (1997). There is some experimental evidence that
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- the probability of detection and the magnitude of the formal
penalty - remain tremendously important in the compliance
equation for many taxpayers. This seems especially true for most if
not all sophisticated taxpayers, by which I mean taxpayers corporations and wealthy individuals, as well as partnerships and
trusts through which wealthy individuals often invest - who hire
expert tax advisors to help them arrange their financial affairs so as to
minimize their taxes, or more precisely to maximize their after-tax
returns on various investments. 14
An important question then, given the interrelated effects of
formal and informal sanctions as well as extrinsic and intrinsic
motivations, is whether the traditional deterrence variables are
currently set at socially optimal levels. Many tax experts think not.
As mentioned in the Introduction,15 there is a widely held view among
tax academics and practitioners that a large and increasing number of
corporations and wealthy individuals are engaging in highly aggressive
tax avoidance transactions, often referred to as tax shelters,16 that lack
any significant economic substance, have no discernible nontax
business purpose, and, although based on literal interpretations of the
Code, produce tax outcomes that any reasonable person would agree
are inconsistent with sound tax principles. Many tax experts view the
solution to the problem as one of deterrence. That is, many would
agree that to address the tax shelter problem, we need to increase the
this crowding out effect is real. See, e.g. , Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine Is a
Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2000) (showing that when parents at a day-care center
were required to pay a fine for being late to pick up their children, compliance
decreased rather than increased). Thus, insofar as the current level of compliance is
due to intrinsic motivations, increasing the formal penalties for noncompliance may
be counterproductive. This need not necessarily be the case, of course, both because
the crowding effect may be small or nonexistent, and in some cases the effect may go
the other way - that is, increasing formal penalties may increase the effect of social
sanctions and intrinsic motivations.
1
4 Below I draw a distinction between "tax advisors" and "tax return preparers."
I use the former term to describe tax experts who help taxpayers plan their
transactions in advance so as to maximize after-tax returns. I use the latter term for
tax experts who help taxpayers fill out and file their returns. Tax preparers therefore
are, for the most part, working with transactions that have already taken place. The
line between advisors and preparers can obviously be blurred; sophisticated taxpayers
may have the same firm that assisted them in setting up various tax-advantaged
transactions prepare their returns. But even then, it would likely be a different
person within the firm. In any event, the distinction holds up in many instances.
15 See supra text accompanying notes 6-7.
16
As I have already mentioned, "tax shelter" has no settled meaning, and there
is much dispute over what qualifies as a shelter and what does not. See supra note 6.
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probability that shelters will be detected by the Service, by either
increasing the frequency and thoroughness of audits - which means
significantly increasing the Service's budget - or increasing disclosure
requirements. In addition, we need to increase substantially the
penalties actually imposed for tax underpayments by either increasing
the size of the penalties on the books or, alternatively, by taking steps
to insure that the penalties that already exist get imposed in
appropriate cases. 17 Other commentators contend that unless the
Service and the courts do a better job of defining what constitutes an
abusive tax shelter, increasing audit rates and penalty assessments will
have little effect. 18 In addition, some tax experts also worry that the
highly publicized spread of sophisticated tax avoidance on the part of
corporate and wealthy taxpayers undermines the average taxpayer's
respect for the system and thus can lead to increased noncompliance
at every level. 19
B. Introducing Legal Uncertainty and the Tax Compliance Continuum
I have been speaking of the terms "compliance" and
"noncompliance" as if they have self-evident meanings. They do not.
In fact, one of the central problems of tax law enforcement is that
these terms are not self-defining, but often mean different things to
17

See, e.g. , Bankman, supra note 7, at 1 786-91 (listing such proposals); Study of
Present-Law Penalty and Interest Provisions as Required by Section 3801 of the
Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (Including Provisions
Relating to Corporate Tax Shelters), TAX NOTES TODAY 232 (July 26, 1999) (LEXIS,
FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 1999 TNT 142-72) (same). See generally
Symposium on Corporate Tax Shelters, 55 TAX L. REv. 125 (2002) (including
numerous articles addressing a range of proposals for enhancing traditional
deterrence variables).
18
James S. Eustice, Abusive Corporate Tax Shelters: Old "Brine" in New Bottles,
55 Tax L. Rev. 135, 160 (2002); Michael L. Schier, Ten More Truths About Tax
Shelters: The Problem, Possible Solutions, and a Reply to Professor Weisbach, 55 TAX
L. REV. 325, 360-62 (2002); David A. Weisbach, Ten Truths About Tax Shelters, 55
TAX L. REV. 215, 248 (2002).
19 U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 7, at 3:
Corporate tax shelters breed disrespect for the tax system - both by the
people who participate in the tax shelter market and by others who
perceive unfairness. A view that well-advised corporations can and do
avoid their legal tax liabilities by engaging in these tax-engineered
transactions may cause a "race to the bottom." If unabated, this will have
long-term consequences to our voluntary tax system far more important
than the revenue losses we currently are experiencing in the corporate tax
base.
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different people, a fact that has consequences for designing an optimal
tax-enforcement regime as well as for the issue of tax law uncertainty.
So what is usually meant by the term "noncompliance?" For starters,
a distinction is often made between "evasion" and "avoidance,"
although the distinction is, to tax experts, notoriously fuzzy. In simple
terms, "evasion" means a clear violation of an unambiguous tax rule.
With tax evasion, then, the taxpayer has no plausible argument that
her position is consistent with the law. In addition, the concept of tax
evasion is often understood to include some element of intentionality
on the part of the taxpayer.20 That is, a tax evader is thought to be
someone who knowingly breaks the tax laws and who, in fact, takes
21
steps to cover up the crime, and thus evade detection. On this view,
a quintessential example of tax evasion would be the intentional
failure to report items of income. Thus, it is tax evasion when a self
employed individual knowingly and intentionally does not report
income that was received during the relevant tax period.22 Likewise,
when an individual or taxable entity deducts expenses that are clearly
not deductible according to the Code, or takes deductions for entirely
fictional expenses, the individual or entity commits tax evasion. In
20

The American Heritage Dictionary defines tax evasion as the " [i]ntentional
avoidance of tax payment usually by inaccurately declaring taxable income." THE
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 2000),
Merriam
available at http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=tax%20evasion.
Webster's Dictionary of Law adds the following gloss in its main entry for tax evasion:
"a willful and esp. criminal attempt to evade the imposition or payment of a tax."
MERRIAM
WEBSTER'S
DICTIONARY
OF
LAW
(1996),
available
at
http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=tax%20evasion.
21
Of course, the old "ignorance of the law" adage applies to taxes as well. Thus,
having a sincere subjective believe that an activity is legal under the tax laws is not an
excuse for tax evasion. In practice, however, it seems likely that unsophisticated
taxpayers will be able to avoid a criminal conviction if they can demonstrate good
faith, albeit mistaken, beliefs in the positions they took or good faith reliance on their
tax advisors. There are some tax positions, however, that likely will get you criminally
punished irrespective of your subjective intent. This is because these positions are so
obviously contrary to established law and have been struck down so many times
before that claims of good faith reliance are not credible. Examples of this would be
such standard tax-protestor arguments as the claim that the filing of federal income
tax returns is "voluntary," understood to mean optional. For a statement and
refutation of this position, see Internal Revenue Serv., Anti-Tax Law Evasion
Schemes - Law and Arguments (Section 1), available at http://www.irs.gov/
businesses/small/article/O,,id=l06502,00.html.
22
Tax evaders often facilitate such off-the-books transactions by insisting on
payment in cash only. See Joseph Bankman, Tax Enforcement: Tax Shelters, the Cash
Economy, and Compliance Costs, 104 TAX NOTES 185, 188 (July 12, 2004).
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addition, if a wealthy individual hides income in a foreign bank
account in a manner that is clearly not allowed by U.S. tax law, that
taxpayer clearly is a tax evader. A conviction for tax evasion under
this definition, because it is a criminal offense, can result in the
perpetrator's not only having to pay back taxes, interest, as well as
civil and criminal penalties, but also having to spend some time in
jaii.23 As I discuss more fully in Part IV below, no tax insurance
policies cover tax evasion defined this way.
If tax evasion is defined as the clear (and usually intentional)
violation of the tax laws in order to reduce one's tax liability, what is
tax avoidance? An obvious possibility suggests itself: Why not define
tax avoidance as arranging your affairs to minimize your taxes in a
manner that is consistent with the tax laws? Or as doing everything
within the law to reduce your tax liability?24 This definition would set
up a nice dichotomy between tax evasion (illegal) and tax avoidance
(legal) and would greatly simplify the job of the tax enforcer, not to
mention the scholar.25 Moreover, just as there are obvious examples
23 The maximum penalty for noncriminal (nonfraudulent) underpayment of
taxes is twenty percent of the tax understatement. I.RC. § 6662(a). The penalty for
civil fraud is seventy-five percent of the understatement. Id. § 6663(a). If a party is
convicted of criminal tax evasion, under the higher standards of proof found in the
criminal system, the maximum penalty for an individual is up to $100,000 and five
years in prison for criminal evasion and $25,000 and/or one year in prison for criminal
failure to file. Id. §§ 7201, 7203.
24 See, e.g. , DAVID L. Scarr, WALL STREET WORDS: AN ESSENTIAL A TO z
GUIDE FOR TODAY'S INVESTOR 379 (1997) (stating definition of tax avoidance as
" [t]he reduction of a tax liability by legal means. For example, high-income
individuals avoid significant federal income taxes by purchasing and holding
municipal bonds.").
25 This
neat dichotomy is often restated in various dictionaries and
encyclopedias. See, e.g. , Tax Avoidance/Evasion, available at http:!/en. wikipedia.orgl
wiki/Tax_evasion (last visited Oct. 4, 2005):

Tax avoidance is the legal exploitation of the tax regime to one's own
advantage, to attempt to reduce the amount of tax that is payable by means
that are within the law whilst making a full disclosure of the material
information to the tax authorities. Examples of tax avoidance involve using
tax deductions, changing one's tax status through incorporation or
establishing an offshore company in a tax haven.
By contrast tax evasion is the general term for efforts by individuals, firms,
trusts and other entities to evade the payment of taxes by illegal means.
Tax evasion usually entails taxpayers deliberately misrepresenting or
concealing the true state of their affairs to the tax authorities to reduce
their tax liability, and includes, in particular, dishonest tax reporting (such

2005]

Tax Law Uncertainty and Tax Insurance

355

of tax evasion, there are obvious examples of legal tax avoidance as
well. For instance, it is clearly legal avoidance when a taxpayer takes
advantage of a so-called tax-expenditure prov1s1on in a
straightforward way. Tax expenditures are Code provisions intended
by Congress to provide subsidies for certain types of activities or
transactions.26 Thus, whether it is investing in tax-exempt bonds or
investing in property subject to accelerated depreciation, the term
"legal avoidance" would fit. Even if you are offended by tax
expenditures as a policy matter, when a taxpayer takes advantage of
them, even if the transaction is primarily tax motivated, the behavior
is clearly legal. Clearly legal avoidance, however, is not limited to tax
expenditures. It might also include some - though, as I will point out
below, not all - investments that exploit the tax advantages inherent
in the structure of the tax laws. An example of this would be a simple
purchase of growth stock in order to get the benefit of the realization
doctrine, as well as the preferential capital gains rate.27 Moreover, to
use the economist's capacious understanding of the term, "tax
avoidance" would include an individual's decision to reduce work
hours in response to the existence of the income tax or an increase in
tax rates, another example of obviously legal behavior. In any event,
what unifies all of these examples is that whether or not one considers
the tax provision in question to be good or bad tax policy, and there is
much debate on that question, there can be no doubt that many of the
as underdeclaring income, profits or gains; or overstating deductions).
Tax avoidance may be considered as either the amoral dodging of one's
duties to society, part of a strategy of not supporting violent government
activities or just the right of every citizen to find all the legal ways to avoid
paying too much tax. Tax evasion, on the other hand, is a crime in almost
all countries and subjects the guilty party to fines or even imprisonment.
Switzerland is one notable exception: tax fraud (forging documents, for
example) is considered a crime, tax evasion (like underdeclaring assets) is
not.
(emphasis omitted).
26
This is not to say, of course, that illegal tax avoidance cannot involve tax
expenditure provisions. Combining a tax expenditure provision with some structural
aspect of the Code to create arbitrage opportunities has been a common way of
achieving questionably legal avoidance. My only point here is that there are some
easy cases of legal avoidance, such as the straightforward use of tax expenditure
provisions.
27 Abusive tax shelters can also involve exploitation of certain structural
elements in the Code, such as the realization doctrine or the distinction between debt
and equity. The point here is that some of the tax savings due to the structure of the
Code are clearly legal, in the sense that they were intended by Congress.
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transactions that exploit these provisions were intended by Congress
and are undoubtedly legal.
Unfortunately, the neat dichotomy between illegal evasion and
legal avoidance does not encompass all the interesting possibilities.
That we can identify clear examples of illegal evasion and legal
avoidance does not mean that all of the tax law is clear-cut. To the
contrary, as every tax practitioner and tax commentator knows - and
as many law students in the introductory federal income tax course
struggle to understand - there are many situations in which the tax
law is unclear and thus distinguishing between what is legal and
illegal, what is permissible and impermissible, can be extremely
difficult. To put the point more precisely, with respect to many
provisions in the tax code, taxpayers face significant uncertainty ex
ante as to how those provisions will be applied by the Service and by
the courts to particular situations that taxpayers confront. Given this
uncertainty, a taxpayer who wishes to comply with the tax laws, either
because of moral compunction or because of a desire to avoid formal
or informal sanctions, but who does not wish to donate money to the
federal government - that is, does not want to pay more than the law
in fact requires - faces the difficulty of making choices based on
rough probability estimates as to what the law "is" at any given time.
And what this means conceptually and, in terms of determining
whether or not the taxpayer will be assessed penalties, what it means
in practice, is that the taxpayer must make an educated guess as to
what some ex post adjudicator will determine the law "is," or, more
precisely, what the law was when the taxpayer engaged in the
transaction or activity in question.
Thinking of tax compliance, and legal compliance more generally,
in these probabilistic terms is on one level obviously unrealistic. We
are accustomed to viewing taxpayers, at least sophisticated taxpayers,
as rational - even hyper-rational - actors. Indeed, it is well known
that some taxpayers are motivated to take especially aggressive, even
illegal, positions on their tax returns precisely because they have
rationally calculated their probability of detection as being very low.
But it is quite a different matter to imagine the average individual
taxpayer doing a probabilistic calculation not to determine whether to
comply with a clear legal rule, but to decipher what the tax law is in
the first place. And yet, at least for sophisticated taxpayers with
expert legal advisors to help them minimize their tax payments while
avoiding penalties, such probabilistic estimates are a part of the
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process.28 Indeed, the tax laws and regulations make the application
of tax penalties for noncompliance depend on such probabilistic
assessments. That is, if the Service and the courts determine ex post
that a particular position taken by a taxpayer is wrong - that the
taxpayer underpaid its taxes - then whether the taxpayer must pay
penalties as well will depend on the Service's and ultimately a court's
ex post assessment of the taxpayer's ex ante probability of success on
For example, the twenty percent "substantial
the merits.
understatement" penalty, which is assessed to taxpayers found to have
understated their tax liability by the lesser of $5000 ($10,000 for
corporations ) or ten percent of the overall liability, can be avoided if it
can be shown that with respect to the tax issue in question the
taxpayer had "substantial authority."29 Substantial authority has been
interpreted by the Service to mean something less than a fifty percent
chance of prevailing on the merits of the issue, assuming the issue is
detected on audit.30 With respect to tax shelters, the probability of
prevailing on the merits must be greater to avoid penalties, which
makes sense given that shelters are a class of transactions that by
definition have relatively weak support in the law.31 Specifically, if the
28

I do not mean to suggest that there is a large class of taxpayers who are
constantly doing probability calculations to determine what the law is with regard to
every tax provision. However, with respect to the tax law provisions (a) that are
uncertain in application and (b) that can have a significant effect on tax liabilities,
many sophisticated taxpayers in fact do such probabilistic calculations - assessing
what the Service and a court will likely say the law is - explicitly or implicitly. Of
course, they also take into account the probability of detection and the likelihood of
penalties, among other factors.
Also, it seems obvious that, in contrast to
sophisticated taxpayers, average individual taxpayers, almost by definition, spend far
less time and resources thinking about such things, if they consider them at all. Even
for those taxpayers, however, insofar as they use paid tax preparers who are tax law
experts, the result can wind up being the same: decisions based on probabilistic
estimates of how an ex post adjudicator will assess the merits of a claim.
29 Alternatively, the substantial understatement penalty can be avoided if the
taxpayer can show that (a) the tax position at issue was disclosed to the Service, and
(b) the position had a "reasonable basis" in the law. I.RC. § 6662(d)(2)(B).
3 0 Treas.
Reg. § l .6662-4(d)(2) (2003). How much less stringent is the
substantial authority standard than the more-likely-than-not standard? That is not
clear, though it is apparently more stringent than the reasonable basis standard.
Reasonable basis, in tum, is a higher standard than "not frivolous" or "not patently
improper." Id. § l .6662-3(b)(3).
31 The Code defines tax shelters as "(I) a partnership or other entity, (II) any
investment plan or arrangement, or (III) any other plan or arrangement, if a
significant purpose of such partnership, entity, plan, or arrangement is the avoidance
or evasion of Federal income tax." I.RC. § 6662(d)(2)(C)(iii). This definition is
obviously less pejorative than my loose operational definition, which includes an
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taxpayer can prove to the Service or a court that the position in
question was ex ante "more likely than not" to succeed on the merits
if it were detected, then the taxpayer can avoid the penalties for tax
understatements with respect to positions that meet the Code's
definition of a tax shelter.32 If all these probabilistic standards were
assumption that position in question would like not survive judicial scrutiny. See
supra note 6.
32 I.RC. § 6662(d)(2). The penalty is higher in certain situations. For example,
if a taxpayer engages in a reportable transaction, which is an even more narrowly
defined set of shelter-type transactions (described in section 6011) but fails to satisfy
special tax shelter reporting requirements, the understatement penalty rises to thirty
percent. I.RC. § 6662A(c). Also, the understatement penalty is forty percent rather
than twenty percent for "gross valuation misstatements." Id. § 6662(h)(l). Finally, a
seventy-five percent penalty can be imposed for fraudulent understatements,
although this penalty is rarely handed out. Id. § 6663. The penalty rules for tax
shelters have recently changed as a result of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004,
Pub. L. No. 108-357, 1 18 Stat. 1418. Prior to that Act, a distinction was drawn
between corporate and noncorporate taxpayers engaged in shelter transactions. For
noncorporate taxpayers, the normal substantial understatement penalty for tax
shelters could be avoided only if (a) there is substantial authority for the position, and
(b) the taxpayer reasonably believed that there was a greater than fifty percent
chance of prevailing on the merits. I.RC. § 6662(d)(2)(C) (amended 2004). And for
purposes of former Code section 6662(d)(2)(C), and thus for tax years ending before
October 22, 2004, this reasonable belief could be established based on a good faith
reliance on a tax advisor's more-likely-than-not opinion, assuming the advice was
based on all the relevant facts and the advisor was qualified. Treas. Reg. § l.66624(g)(4)(ii) (2003). This reduction in the substantial understatement penalty, again,
was not available to corporate taxpayers. The 2004 Act eliminated this option for
noncorporate taxpayers. See I.RC. § 6662(d)(2)(C). However, the understatement
penalties generally can be abated, for corporate and noncorporate taxpayers, if a
taxpayer can demonstrate that it acted with "reasonable cause" and in "good faith" in
reporting the position in question. Id. § 6664(c). The relevant regulations provide
that reasonable cause exists where the taxpayer "reasonably relies in good faith on
the opinion of a professional tax advisor . . . [who] unambiguously concludes [on the
basis of the pertinent facts and authorities] that there is a greater than 50-percent
likelihood that the tax treatment of the item will be upheld if challenged by the"
Service. Treas. Reg. §§ l .6662-4(g)(4)(i)(B), l .6664-4(c) (2003). The 2004 Act,
however, changed the reasonable cause abatement provision as well by implementing,
in effect, a strict liability standard for understatements attributable to so-called
"listed" or "reportable transactions," which, as defined under Code section 6011 , are
transactions that the Service has identified as special categories of tax shelters or
potential tax shelters. I.RC. § 6664(c). If a transaction falls under these new rules,
which also apply to tax years ending after October 22, 2004, there is a stricter set of
reasonable cause and good faith standards that must be satisfied to avoid the penalty.
Even these stricter standards, however, require the taxpayer to show, among other
things, that it reasonably believed that the position in question had a better-than-fifty
percent chance of prevailing on the merits if detected. Thus, quantifiable merits risk
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not enough, there is also the "realistic possibility of success" standard,
which governs certain tax preparer penalties and is quantified as at
least a 33 percent chance of winning on the merits, again, assuming
detection.33
In sum, the penalty provisions in the Code force taxpayers to
think about tax law in probabilistic terms. At least with respect to
Code provisions whose application is uncertain, or uncertain in some
contexts, taxpayers who want to avoid penalties must assess the
chances that a particular interpretation will be upheld or rejected.
One way of thinking of the choice confronted by the taxpayer under
these conditions of substantive legal uncertainty is to imagine any
given interpretation of the tax laws falling somewhere on a
continuum. What the continuum measures is the ex ante probability
that a court will decide that the particular tax law interpretation the
taxpayer has chosen or is relying upon is the correct one, assuming the
position is detected and evaluated by a court - that is, assuming
detection risk to be 100 percent. If the interpretation were to fall on
one end of the continuum, that position would be considered outright
tax evasion, since it would have a zero probability of being sustained
on the merits if examined by a court. If the interpretation were to fall
on the other end of the spectrum, it would be considered
unambiguously legal, which means here that the probability that the
position would be upheld on the merits by a court if examined is 100
percent. Moreover, we can conceive of movement along the
continuum as representing a change in the probability that a court will
accept the taxpayer's position on the merits.34 For all practical
is still an essential test. In addition to satisfying this more-likely-than-not test, there
must be for reportable and listed transactions, (a) adequate disclosure of relevant
facts (as required under section 6011), and (b) substantial authority. Also, in
determining whether there was reasonable belief in a better than fifty-percent chance
of winning, the taxpayer may have relied on expert advice, but must not have relied
on certain types of "disqualified opinions" or "disqualified tax advisors," the latter of
which includes tax shelter promoters. Id.
33 Treas. Reg. § l .6694-2(c) (1992).
34 Thinking of the tax-compliance question in terms of a continuum is not new.
Daniel Shaviro, for example, has pointed out the continuous nature of these
distinctions:
Aggressive paper shuffling to minimize tax liability is not identical to
cheating if its being impermissible under the existing state of the law is not
clear-cut. But there is an issue of degree here, and a slippery slope. Taking
self-interested but reasonable reporting positions slides over into taking
positions that are more and more unlikely to be sustained and, therefore,
deliberately kept secret, converting the entire enterprise into one of playing
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purposes, at least for sophisticated taxpayers engaged in tax planning,
the most important part of the continuum lies somewhere in the
middle.35
All of this can be illustrated in a simple schematic.
FIGURE 1 .
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the "audit lottery" rather than taking a position that one believes is actually
reasonable under the law. At a certain point, although it is hard to say
exactly where, aggressive planning merges into outright cheating. Even
before that point is reached, the former starts to have many of the same bad
effects on general compliance as the latter.
DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY: WHY
THEY ARE A PROBLEM AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 25 (2004).
35 According to some corporate tax practitioners, tax planning is when a
taxpayer wants to engage in a transaction primarily for nontax business reasons, but
wishes to structure the transaction so as to minimize its tax liability consistent with the
tax laws - or consistent with how Congress intended the tax laws to be applied.
Thus, most practitioners, and some academics, would recognize tax planning as a type
of legal and legitimate tax avoidance. See, e.g. , Schier, Ten More Truths, supra note
18, at 384 ("Tax planning is not all bad."). Others, however, regard most tax planning
activity as being questionably legal, under a sound conception of economic
performance, and consider most, if not all, tax planning as socially undesirable. See,
e.g. , Weisbach, Ten Truths, supra note 18, at 222 ("There is no social benefit to tax
planning.").

�
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On the left side of the continuum, the merits risk
i.e., the
chance of losing on the merits if detected - at some point reaches 100
percent; or, conversely, the probability of winning on the merits
reaches zero. This point is represented in Figure 1 by Point A. Thus,
all tax positions or interpretations of the Code to the left of A are
clearly illegal and constitute tax evasion. By contrast, on the right end
of the continuum lies a point beyond which the merits risk is zero, and
hence the chance of winning on the merits is 100 percent. B marks
that point: the beginning of the domain of clearly legal avoidance.
Although there can be interesting questions around Points A and B,
and determining on which side of those points a particular tax position
will fall can be difficult,36 the most interesting questions in tax
enforcement, at least for most sophisticated taxpayers, lie in the
middle part of the continuum between points A and B. This is true
for several reasons. First, virtually all sophisticated taxpayers want to
avoid even the appearance of outright evasion since the consequences
in terms of formal and informal penalties would be catastrophic.
Thus, they will keep their interpretations comfortably to the right of
Point A. At the same time, many sophisticated taxpayers will be
induced to push their interpretations of the Code to the left of Point B
to ensure that they pay no more in taxes then they actually owe.
This conclusion suggests that where the action is on the
continuum is the region clustering around the midpoint between A
and B. Where this region begins and ends is impossible to say. It is
also impossible to say with any certainty whether this region is, in the
real world, centered on something like Point C in a natural bell curve
formation of sorts, or whether instead it would be skewed to one side
or the other. The answer to those questions would depend on the
balancing of a number of forces including the competitive market
pressures to minimize taxes paid; the role of more-likely-than-not
opinions tax shelter opinions as an effective form of penalty insurance;
the probability of detection; and the size of the formal and informal
penalties. For example, some commentators contend that corporate
managers desperately want to avoid getting hit with tax penalties,
which could be a career ending event for them.37 This fact could push
36 Obviously there are also disputes about whether a particular tax position
constitutes criminal evasion or whether it falls just on the noncriminal side of the line.
Indeed, both points (A and B) have their own problems of "fuzziness," but those
areas are not as interesting, or as problematic, as the large grey area in the middle
region.
37 See Bankman, supra note 7, at 1792 ("In the past, at least, imposition of a 20
percent penalty was seen as a career-ending event for the responsible official in a
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taxpayers towards interpretations or transaction to the right of C.
Pushing in the other direction, however, is the very low probability of
detection and the very low penalties for getting the law wrong as well
as the existence of tax penalty insurance that is provided by tax
advisors in the form of more-likely-than-not shelter opinions. These
are legal opinions provided by tax advisors that analyze the tax
position being considered and almost inevitably conclude that the
position is more likely than not to be sustained on the merits if
detected on audit and ultimately evaluated by a court. In other words,
these opinions in effect conclude that the reporting position falls to
the right of Point C. It is generally believed that having a more-likely
than-not opinion effectively eliminates the risk of a substantial
understatement penalty for a tax shelter position as courts tend to be
deferential to such opinions when it comes to assessing penalties.38
Again, anecdotal evidence and conventional wisdom among tax
experts suggest that something of the sort is in fact happening; hence
the recent hubbub about tax shelter activity and the role of tax shelter
opm10ns. 39
We shall return to the idea of the tax compliance continuum and
the problem of aggressive avoidance below. For now, the important
idea to take from this discussion is the general one: that the tax law
can be characterized by significant substantive uncertainty and thus
can be viewed probabilistically from an ex ante perspective. What will
become clear below is that this fact can have serious consequences in
terms of overall social welfare.
•

•

company's tax department. In many companies, this may be true today.").
38 Id. at 1 779 ("In theory, such opinions ought not to serve as protection from
the substantial understatement penalty. In practice, any run-of-the-mill opinion letter
is thought to insulate the taxpayer from the substantial understatement
penalty . . . . ").
3 9 Indeed, this concern about the increase in tax shelter activity and the role of
more-likely-than-not opinions led to the recently finalized revisions to Circular 230,
which were designed to increase the standards of practitioners issuing tax opinions on
transactions whose principle (or even significant) purpose is tax evasion or avoidance.
Regulations Governing Practice Before the Internal Revenue Service, 69 Fed. Reg.
75,839 (Dec. 20, 2004) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. §§ 10.33, 10.35 to .38, 10.52, and
10.93). For a discussion of the new tax opinion standards in Circular 230, see Arthur
L. Baily & Alexis Macivor, New Circular 230 Regulations Impose Strict Standards for
Tax Practitioners, 107 TAX NOTES 341 (Apr. 18, 2005).
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C. Sources of Legal Uncertainty: Rules and Standards in Tax Law
Before we address the consequences of tax law uncertainty, there
is more to be said about the sources. That there can be significant
substantive legal uncertainty in the tax laws may come as a surprise to
nonexperts in the field. After all, the tax system is the quintessential
rule-based, as opposed to a standards-based, legal regime. Almost by
definition there is supposed to be less substantive legal uncertainty
with a system of rules than with a system of standards. Although the
tax system is primarily a system of rules, it is inevitably a system of
standards as well, as some scholars have recently begun to
emphasize.40 This is because, even in a system with highly complex
rules - in fact, perhaps especially in such a system - there can be
difficult questions of how the rules are to be applied to complex
transactions.
The rules/standards distinction in law is well known. With a rule,
the relevant lawmaker (whether it be Congress or some agency acting
as rule-promulgator) determines ex ante - that is, before the conduct
being regulated takes place - relatively precisely what conduct is
permitted or compelled under what particular circumstances. With a
standard, by contrast, the ex ante lawmaker provides relatively few
details regarding the regulated conduct, leaving more of the content of
the command to be provided ex post. Thus, with rules, the ex ante
lawmakers, be they part of a legislature or agency, must provide most
of the normative content of the rule; while ex post adjudicators, be
they judges, jurors, or agency officials, are responsible primarily only
for applying law to facts. With standards, the job of the ex ante
lawmaker is somewhat easier, but the ex post adjudicator must both
provide content to the law and apply the law to the facts at hand.41
The classic illustration of the rules/standards distinction involves
traffic safety laws.42 A traffic safety rule might be that drivers may not
40 DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY:
WHY THEY ARE A PROBLEM AND WHAT WE CAN Do ABOUT IT 4-6 (2004); David A.
Weisbach, An Economic Analysis of Tax A voidance Doctrines, 4 AM. L. & ECON.
REV. 88, 89-92 (2002).
41 Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J.
557 (1992).
42 Id. at 560.
For a summary of how the rules/standards distinction has been
applied in the tax context specifically, see SHAVIRO, supra note 34, at 4-6, and David
A. Weisbach, Formalism in the Tax Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 860 (1999). Of course,
there can be both standards and rules governing the same activity, and that often is
the case for activities - such as operating an automobile - that present special
regulatory concerns.
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exceed fifty-five miles per hour on the highway. The only issue for the
ex post adjudicator then is whether a particular driver exceeded the
speed lim.it.43 A traffic safety standard, by contrast, might require that
drivers always drive reasonably under the circumstances, leaving the
ex post adjudicator to determine not only the speed at which the
driver was traveling but also whether that speed was reasonable.
Common sense would suggest that for the driver trying to decide how
to drive consistently with the laws, the relatively vague standard
would present significantly greater legal uncertainty than would the
relatively clear speed limit rule. Indeed, some have even suggested
that the differing degrees of legal uncertainty provide one essential
way of distinguishing rules from standards.44
What does all this have to do with taxes? Is the federal income
tax system the quintessential system of rules, or is it not?45 It is
certainly true that the federal tax system has one of the most complex
and comprehensive set of rules of any area of American law. Even
though a good case can probably be made for simplifying the existing
tax code, as most tax experts recommend,46 such simplification would
not eliminate the need for many detailed and complex rules. In other
words, it almost certainly makes sense that the tax system should have
a lot of detailed rules, even if not as many rules as we currently have.47
43 Obviously a rule of this sort could be more complex than this, providing
different speed limits for different situations.
44 Louis Kaplow, General Characteristics of Rules, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW
AND ECONOMICS: THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND LITIGATION 502, 513 (Boudewijn
Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000) ("Indeed, if rules are defined as the extent
to which legal commands are given content ex ante and thus the ease with which
private parties can predict how the law will apply to their conduct, legal uncertainty
might be viewed as simply a measure of the extent to which a legal command is
standard-like."). As I argue below, see infra text accompanying notes 59-60, however,
uncertainty can arise precisely because of the complexity of rules and hence the
difficulty of determining how such complex rules will be applied in specific settings.
45 Weisbach, supra note 42, at 860 ("The tax law is the paradigmatic system of
rules."). Weisbach then goes on to explain why lawmakers have begun to introduce
standards into the tax law's predominantly rule-based approach. Id.
46 William G. Gale, Tax Simplification: Issues and Options, Testimony before
House Ways and Means Committee, July 17, 2001 ("The notion that taxes should be
simpler is one of the very few propositions in tax policy that generates universal
agreement.") , available at http://www.brookings.edu/views/testimony/gale/
20010717.pdf.
47 Noel B. Cunningham & James R. Repetti, Textualism and Tax Shelters, 24
VA. TAX REV. 1 , 56 (2004) ("The Code (including subchapter K) has been, and
undoubtedly will continue to be, primarily a rule-based statute. It is important that
the 'millions of taxpayers who engage in billions of transactions' be able to file annual
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Why is this so? According to the orthodox legal theory of rules and
standards, relatively detailed rules are generally preferable when the
cost of determining ex ante what the permissible or required conduct
should be for a given situation is low relative to an ex post
determination, and when the frequency of application of the rule is
likely to be high.48 By contrast, standards are to be preferred when an
ex ante determination of the optimal conduct is relatively costly and
when the norm in question will be applied by the ex post adjudicator
relatively infrequently.49 This is why it could make sense in a tort
system to have a general, somewhat vague reasonableness standard
regulating the conduct of, say, drivers,50 but it is difficult even to
conceive of a tax system composed entirely of standards to be
adjudicated ex post. Consider the silliness, for example, of a
hypothetical tax system that had no detailed rules but merely required
all taxpayers to remit to the government each year a reasonable
amount under the circumstances. The current compliance problems
would pale by comparison to those inherent in such a system. In sum,
any comprehensive tax regime will need to have detailed and complex
rules.51
However, just as the tax system cannot rely solely on standards,
neither can it rely exclusively on rules. Thus, as with presumably
every area of law, the tax system is a mixed one; and although rules
predominate in the U.S. tax system, the use of standards is growing.
The reasons for this trend are simple. First, a pure rule-based
approach simply is not feasible; neither Congress nor the Treasury
tax returns with some degree of certainty without incurring huge compliance costs.")
(quoting Kaplow, supra note 41, at 573); Weisbach, supra note 42, at 866 ("[G)iven
the vast number of transactions governed by the tax law, there would be virtually no
case for which the ex ante promulgation costs would exceed the ex post application
costs; therefore the tax law should be promulgated almost entirely through rules.").
48 Kaplow, supra note 41, at 562.
49 Id.
50 It also makes sense to have some traffic rules, given that it is fairly easy to
determine that driving over the speed limit (or, even more obviously, driving on the
wrong side of the road) is almost always a bad idea.
51 That is, we should expect the tax system to be relatively more rules-based
than, say, the general tort system. This is not to deny, of course, that a plausible tax
regime might rely substantially less on detailed rules than the U.S. system does. It
should also be noted that even a legal regime that seems to be primarily standards
based can develop into a more rules-based regime over time as, for example, when
court decisions interpreting and applying the standard to various factual situations
begin to accumulate. See Kaplow, supra note 41, at 577-78 (discussing way in which
precedential value of ex post decisions by courts and other adjudicators can make
standards more rule-like).
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Department can possibly anticipate all of the conceivable transactions
that will be affected by the tax laws, nor would they want to. The
Code is too long as it is, and, in any event, there comes a point at
which the cost of ex ante rule-making, including that of the added
complexity to the system, becomes prohibitive. Second, and more
important, whatever tax rules are adopted, no matter how specific or
detailed or comprehensive they are, sophisticated taxpayers with
fancy tax lawyers and accountants will always find opportunities for
aggressive or abusive tax avoidance. Put differently, it simply is not
possible to write tax laws that are devoid of all unintended loopholes.
These loopholes in turn are exploited by smart tax advisors seeking
zealously to represent their corporate, and increasingly their wealthy
individual, clients. Thus, competition induces tax advisors to compete
to provide the most aggressive, tax-minimizing interpretations of the
tax laws possible, constrained only by the threat of taxpayer penalties,
which, given the more likely than not opinions discussed above, is
often empty.52 As a result, what was a potentially small loophole with
relevance to only a few transactions, and thus not worth worrying
about, becomes a large loophole as enterprising tax advisors funnel
money and clients through such gaps.53 The problem with such
opportunistic and aggressive exploitation of unintended loopholes (or
discontinuities) in the tax system, of course, is that they produce both
distributive unfairness in the short run, as not all taxpayers are equally
able to avail themselves of these techniques, and inefficiency in the
long run, as taxpayers shift into the fields that have the most, or are
best able to exploit, tax loopholes, pushing down the pre-tax rate of
return in those fields but artificially increasing the number of investors
or participants in those fields. The point here is that, under a pure
rule-based approach to generating tax law (that is, assuming there
were no background anti-avoidance standards to deter abusive
avoidance - no economic substance, business purpose, or sham
transaction doctrines), and if neither Congress nor the Treasury
Department did anything to stop it, the harm to the tax system would
52

See supra text accompanying notes 28-35.
As David Weisbach puts this point, the problem with a rules-based tax system
generally is that the uncommon transaction - the one that it is, by definition, not cost
effective to handle with an ex ante rule - can become a common transaction, as
clever tax advisors identify such loopholes and then market them to high-income
individuals and corporations. Weisbach, supra note 42, at 868-70. As Weisbach
points out, this inherent vulnerability of rule-based systems may exist in other areas of
law as well, but seems to be especially problematic in the tax area, for a number of
reasons, including a pervasive culture of tax law manipulation. Id. at 870-71.
53
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be catastrophic. Under these assumptions, there would be no
mechanism for closing loopholes. The tax system would either
collapse or become something very different from what it now is, as
only the unsophisticated or altruistic would pay any income taxes at
all.
Of course, neither Congress nor the Treasury would let the tax
system collapse. The question is how Congress and the Treasury
should respond to such inevitable gaps in the law. Consider the pure
rule-based approach, which would work something like this: When a
new loophole is discovered, a new rule would have to be adopted to
close it, either by Congress or by the Treasury acting as rule
promulgator. These new loophole-closing rules would likely be made
prospective in application. At least that is how things have worked
historically. What "prospectivity" means here is that the new rules
would apply for the most part only to future tax years. 54 These new
loophole-closing rules would then be followed by another round of tax
shelter "innovation" on the part of tax advisors, who would either
finds gaps in the new rules or elsewhere in the tax laws. Congress or
the Treasury would eventually respond with another round of
prospective loophole-closing legislation or rulemaking, and the cycle
would continue. The result of such a purely rule-based approach, as
University of Chicago Law Professor David Weisbach has noted,
would be an enormous and costly increase in the complexity of the tax
laws. 55 Contrast this scenario with a mixed tax system of mostly rules,
54 This sort of nominally prospective rule change can of course have retroactive
effects, insofar as taxpayers made investments in reliance on the previous rules and
expected to benefit from the old rule for a number of future tax years. See generally
Michael J. Graetz, Legal Transitions: The Case of Retroactivity in Income Tax
Revision, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 47, 49-50 (1977) (defining "nominal prospectivity" and
"nominal retroactivity"). In some cases, taxpayers in these circumstances are able to
get even greater transition relief by way of a grandfather rule of some sort.
Note that if a rule-based response to tax
55 Weisbach, supra note 42, at 861.
loopholes were made nominally retroactive, which they almost never are, it would be
comparable to a standard-based response to aggressive tax avoidance, since ex post
anti-avoidance determinations by courts are always applied retroactively. The only
difference is that with a retroactive rule-based approach, the ex post decision is made
by Congress or the Treasury Department in their rulemaking capacities. Under such
a retroactive rule-based approach, it is not entirely clear that there would be an
increase in complexity as compared with a standard-based approach that relies
principally on courts as ex post adjudicators. Either way, taxpayers would be deterred
from looking for loopholes in the first place if they knew they would eventually be
shut down retroactively. This sort of retroactive repeal, however, is very difficult to
accomplish as a political matter. Moreover, at least as far as Congress is concerned,
there may be public choice reasons why such loophole-closing legislation would be
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but with a background anti-avoidance standard. Under such a mixed
system, which is not terribly different from what we have today, the
anti-avoidance standard provides deterrence relatively cheaply by
closing loopholes retroactively; but it does so without producing
nearly as much overall complexity as does the prospective rule-based
approach.56 Again, this is because an anti-avoidance standard need
not specify in advance every conceivable example of abusive
avoidance - every unintended tax loophole - that will be struck
down. It need only state that transactions that fail to satisfy the
standard, whether economic substance, business purpose, or
something else, will be disallowed, in which case the taxpayer will owe
back taxes plus interest and, if the interpretation of the Code was too
aggressive, penalties as well. It is the tax law equivalent of the
negligence doctrine in torts. Professor Daniel Shaviro of NYU Law
School describes benefits of anti-avoidance standards in tax as follows:
One key reason for using a standard is that the IRS and the
courts can apply it across the board, without raising issues of
undue retroactivity, even if the government failed to
anticipate a particular trick and state in advance that it does
not work. There are simply too many fault lines in the
existing income tax and too many clever people laboring
behind closed doors to find new ways to exploit these fault
lines for after-the-fact prospective responses to be adequate.57
D. The Consequences of Legal Uncertainty
It is conventional wisdom that with the use of legal standards
comes a degree of substantive legal uncertainty. In fact, Harvard Law
School Professor Louis Kaplow has put the relationship between
slow in coming, thus making reliance solely on a rule-based response aggressive
avoidance impractical.
56 See Weisbach, supra note 42, at 861; cf Kaplow, supra note 41 , at 593-96
(challenging the assumption that standards tend to be more complex than rules). This
view seems correct as far as it goes. When we introduce the possibility of uncertainty
and the purchase of liability insurance for the consequences of uncertain legal
standards, however, the use of a standard-based approach to tax law or any other area
of law, if accompanied by the purchase of liability insurance, would not necessarily
reduce overall complexity, though it might. The question is whether insurers in
underwriting their policies would simply replace the complexity of detailed tax rules
with the complexity of detailed insurance policies. The point is that the comparative
complexity of the two approaches is not entirely clear.
57 SHAVIRO, supra note 34, at 23.
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standards and uncertainty this way:
[I]f rules are defined as the extent to which legal commands
are given content ex ante and thus the ease with which private
parties can predict how the law will apply to their conduct,
legal uncertainty might be viewed as simply a measure of the
extent to which a legal command is standard-like.58
Thus, on this view, when a standard is used in lieu of a system of
rules, there is a tradeoff between the benefits of reduced complexity
and the costs of increased uncertainty. To see this point, go back to
the traffic-safety example, where the roads are governed by a general
negligence standard requiring reasonable driving. In that example,
when I am deciding how carefully to drive my car or whether to drive
at all, I face the possibility that in the event of an accident my driving
will be deemed to have been unreasonable under the circumstances,
thus making me liable for the accident costs. The threat of such ex
post liability can give me an incentive to drive carefully; that incentive
is the deterrence value of a tort standard. But that threat also creates
legal uncertainty for me. Indeed, the possibility that my driving will
be considered by a court ex post to have been unreasonable, and the
cause of someone else's harm, is just the sort of legal uncertainty that
can motivate me to purchase auto liability insurance. A similar story
can be told for any situation in which a liability standard is used; and
thus a similar story can be told with respect to the use of anti
avoidance standards in the tax field. Because an anti-avoidance
standard necessarily leaves open the precise definition of what
constitutes impermissible tax avoidance, taxpayers engaged in tax
planning must face a degree of legal uncertainty, uncertainty as to
what the law is and how it will be applied to a given factual situation.
It must also be said, however, that a system that consists almost
entirely of complex rules also can produce a type of legal uncertainty.
This fact, which typically gets overlooked in discussions of rules and
standards, becomes evident when one considers the plight of the
average individual taxpayer attempting to fill out his tax return. The
Code is so detailed and complex and just plain long that most
individual taxpayers who attempt to do their own returns can have
little certainty on April 15 that they have fully complied with the law.
Indeed, this is why so many individual taxpayers now use tax return
preparers or tax preparation software, both of which serve as a sort of
insurance against the uncertainties of the tax laws. Indeed, as
58

Kaplow, supra note 44, at 513.
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discussed below, tax return preparers and tax software companies
often provide warranties with their services, which literally serve as
insurance for taxpayers against the risk that the return preparer will
make a mistake on some detail of the law.59 Finally, in addition to the
uncertainties regarding what the appropriate application of the legal
rule or standard is, there is also the uncertainty associated with the
possibility of erroneous decisions on the part of the law enforcers.
That is, the Service and the court may mistakenly determine that the
taxpayer has violated the law. That possibility is an element of
substantive legal uncertainty that taxpayers must also take into
account.60
So what is the big deal with a little uncertainty? The world is full
of uncertainties, and yet life seems to go on. Get over it. Most of us
are not generally paralyzed by the existence of the uncertainty around
us. True enough. That does not mean, however, that uncertainty is
per se good. For starters, people do not like uncertainty; at least
many people do not like many types of uncertainty. This is what
economists mean when they say that an individual is risk-averse. To
put the point somewhat technically, a risk-averse individual is
someone who, when comparing a certain dollar amount with an
uncertain prospect of the same expected value, prefers the former. In
other words, those who are risk-averse are willing to pay something at least an actuarially fair insurance premium (a premium equal to the
weighted probability of the loss multiplied by the magnitude) - to
shift a risk of loss to an insurance company. Although there is plenty
of evidence of risk-preferring behavior out there as well, from
organized gambling to bungee jumping, it is generally assumed that
many individuals are risk-averse with respect to many types of risks
that involve a small likelihood of a large potential loss.61 Substantive
legal risk or uncertainty can fall into this category as well. 62 What this
means is that legal risk is something that most people would pay to
avoid, which in turn means that social welfare would be enhanced if
legal risk could be reduced or eliminated at a cost less than what
59

See infra Part III (discussing tax preparer services).
John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on
Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965, 968 (1984).
61
In one of the all time great examples of circular reasoning, the assumption
that individuals are in fact risk-averse derives largely from the observation that
individuals behave as if risk-averse - such as by purchasing insurance.
62
I use the terms "risk" and "uncertainty" interchangeably here. Their
technical meanings, as the terms are used by economists and insurance experts, are in
fact different, but that difference is not important for current purposes.
60
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people are willing to pay to shed it.
That, in a nutshell, is why legal risk or legal uncertainty can be a
bad thing from the perspective of individual consumers or taxpayers.
This same explanation would apply to any corporate taxpayer that is
privately owned and to any partnership arrangement in which the
partners are individuals.63 It is a little harder to understand, however,
why a corporation whose stock is publicly traded would be averse to
legal uncertainty. In theory, most if not all of the shareholders of a
public corporation are diversified, meaning they own shares in enough
companies and in enough industries whose risks are not correlated
with each other that they - the shareholders - are actually
indifferent as to the risks that affect any individual company. In other
words, a fully diversified shareholder is concerned only with economy
wide risks and how the stocks in their portfolios respond to economy
wide fluctuations, not with any firm-specific risk. The uncertainty as
to how the laws, including the tax laws, will be applied to a particular
corporation's circumstances, such as to a particular transaction, is one
such firm-specific risk. Given this fact, if managers of public
corporations were acting as loyal agents for their diversified
shareholders, they should likewise behave as if they are risk-neutral
with respect to firm-specific risks, including legal risks - including,
even more specifically, tax law risks. And yet public corporations buy
liability insurance all the time. Moreover, many of the tax risk
insurance policies that have been sold were purchased by public
corporations. Why would that happen if shareholders are in fact risk
neutral?
There are a number of possible explanations.64 First, even if
corporate shareholders are risk-neutral, corporate managers,
including tax managers, may well be risk-averse with respect to certain
types of catastrophic, potentially bankrupting, liabilities. This might
be so, for example, if managers have nondiversifiable human capital at
risk in their respective companies. Moreover, even if the potential
legal risks do not threaten to bankrupt the company, a negative,
uninsured legal outcome may end the careers of corporate managers,
63 Although one might reasonably assume that entrepreneurs are less risk-averse
than the average individual, it might still be the case that such investors or business
people prefer to limit or eliminate some types of risk - that is, even risk neutral or
risk seeking entrepreneurs often want to limit the domain of their risk taking
behavior, and this can be done through the purchase of insurance.
64 For a list of explanations for the corporate demand for insurance, see David
Mayers & Clifford W. Smith, Jr., On the Corporate Demand for Insurance, 55 J. Bus.
281 (1982).
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a prospect that would certainly be enough to make corporate
managers risk-averse with respect to such liabilities. And, indeed, this
is thought to be the case with the risk of a tax penalty assessment.65
Second, the purchase of insurance by a corporation might be thought
of as a means of securing reliable, bonded advice regarding how to
minimize losses. That is, insurers may be seen as experts in risk
management, and by selling an insurance policy to the corporation,
the insurer has also agreed in effect to give the insured corporation
the benefit of its expertise in reducing insured risks. Moreover, the
advice is bonded, in the sense that the insurer has agreed to be on the
hook for the resulting losses if its risk-reduction advice is followed.66
As will be discussed more fully below, a case can be made that tax risk
insurance serves this bonded-advice function as well. Finally, if we
take at face value the explanations that corporate managers of large
corporations often provide to justify their purchases of corporate
insurance, and if we take seriously the pitch that insurance brokers
use to market insurance policies to corporate risk managers, the best
explanations for the purchase of insurance - including tax risk
insurance - by public corporations may depend on the assumption
that there is some level of risk-aversion, or perhaps some level of
residual irrationality, among investors. A simplified version of this
story goes as follows: Management is worried that, if there is a large
unforeseen liability in a particular year, whether a tort judgment or a
tax deficiency, will cause a "shock" to, or a surprise downward
movement in, reported earnings. The catch is that such a shock to
earning can cause investors to overreact, leading to a drop in share
price, which even if temporary can have consequences for the
company by raising the cost of capital.67 Thus, if a corporation
discovers a new potential liability and books a reserve for it on its
financial statements, such a reserve, if large, can affect share price and
in turn the cost of capital. Insurance provides a means of eliminating
such shocks. Instead of waiting for the large loss to occur and
expensing it then, and instead of booking a reserve in anticipation of
the loss's occurrence, the corporation can simply pay a premium to an
insurance company and shift the risk to the insurer. Such an insurance
transaction in effect removes the liability from the insured
corporation's balance sheet. In any event, however one describes this
capital-market-shock theory, it amounts to a type of risk-aversion on
65

See Bankman, supra note 7, at 1784.
See Mayers & Smith, supra note 64, at 288--89.
67 It can also have consequences for management compensation, which might
itself produce risk-aversion among managers.
66
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the part of corporate investors, even supposedly diversified ones.
The foregoing is an account of why individuals and corporations
purchase insurance; thus, in a sense it is an account of the costs of
uncertainty, including tax law uncertainty. Besides this general cost of
risk-bearing associated with legal uncertainty, there is another cost as
well. Legal uncertainty can induce taxpayers, especially risk-averse
taxpayers, to over-comply with the law in various ways. Taxpayers
could manifest over-compliance in a number of ways, such as changing
the structure of their transactions, deciding not to engage in the
transaction in question, or engaging the transaction as planned but
without taking advantage of the more favorable tax treatment to
which they are arguably - though by assumption not certainly entitled. One way of understanding this sort of over-compliance is to
refer back to the tax compliance continuum. Over-compliance, for
example, might mean that taxpayers would tend to avoid taking
positions that approached the more-likely-than-not threshold - that
is, they would stay comfortably to the right of Point C - by avoiding
even remotely questionable transactions or reporting positions. All of
these types of over-compliance constitute social waste and can even
produce distributional inequities insofar as the effects of the legal
uncertainty and differential risk-bearing are unfairly distributed across
68
taxpayers.
68 Note that the existence of substantive legal uncertainty can cause distortions
in taxpayer behavior even if taxpayers are neutral with respect to risk. Calfee &
Craswell, supra note 60, at 1002-03. This can occur, for example, if the legal standard
being applied takes a form similar to a negligence rule, under which the individual or
firm can avoid the entire penalty if they merely, and only barely, satisfy a threshold
standard of care. The intuition behind this somewhat counter-intuitive point can be
illustrated in an example from tort law. Imagine that a product-safety standard says
merely that product manufacturers should make their products reasonably safe, with
"reasonably safe" meaning "cost-justifiably safe," taking into account the full social
costs of accidents caused by the product. Assume further that what this means ideally
is that, for example, a maker of $200 lawnmowers should invest $25 per mower to
install the latest foot protection technology. Anything less than that investment
would be considered negligent in a tort case in the event of an injury; anything more
than that would be unnecessary and inefficient, because it would force consumers to
purchase a safer product than is necessary under the circumstances. If the legal
standard is uncertain, and the manufacturer cannot determine ex ante precisely what
the cost-effective safety device is, and if the penalty for noncompliance is large
enough, the manufacturer may have an incentive to install, say, a $27 (or $30 or $35)
foot protector instead of the efficient $25 one in order to eliminate the threat of
potential liability - which disappears entirely when the threshold of reasonable care
has been met. This theoretical possibility of over-compliance, which again applies
even in the absence of risk-aversion on the part of the regulated party, though risk-
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Given the nature of tax law, with its mixture of complex,
sometimes inscrutable rules and background anti-avoidance
standards, it is inevitable that there will be some measure of
substantive legal uncertainty. The existence of such uncertainty can
lead to behavioral distortions, inefficient risk bearing, and both under
and over-compliance with the tax laws. What if anything should be
done about this? One answer is: nothing. Perhaps since the current
penalties for tax noncompliance and the probability of detection are
so low - too low to produce optimal compliance incentives - a case
can be made for using tax law uncertainty as a second-best form of
deterrence. That is, given the existing incentives to under-comply
with the tax laws, maybe the deterrence value of a little legal
uncertainty will at least help to even things out. Indeed, the only thing
preventing some taxpayers from being more aggressive in their tax
planning may be the residual level of uncertainty within the tax laws.69
And this might even be Congress's intent; lawmakers may have left
some uncertainties in the tax laws with the hope in mind that
taxpayers, seeking to avoid uncertainty, would err on the side of
caution. That is possible. But if that were Congress's intent, it has not
done a good job of saying so. Moreover, using such legal uncertainty
in this way is a fairly imprecise tool for deterring aggressive tax
aversion exacerbates the effect, has been demonstrated in the context of tort
standards. Id. at 990. It would also apply to the context of tax enforcement. Thus,
for example, a taxpayer facing uncertainty as to how the IRS or a court will apply, say,
the economic substance or business purpose doctrines to the taxpayer's particular
transaction might decide to over-comply with the law by building into the transaction
an excessive amount of nontax business risk, just to ensure compliance with the
standards and thus avoid underpayment penalties, even though such additional risk is
pure economic waste. Of course, an anti-avoidance standard that ends up inducing
some taxpayers to structure some transactions with some amount of real economic
risk or substantive business investment that they would not have otherwise, in the
absence of the standard, can be optimal overall. One of the ways that anti-avoidance
standards work is to create such "frictions" that hinder or limit the extent to which
taxpayers can achieve both (a) the economic substance they are seeking and (b) that
tax treatment they are seeking. Daniel N. Shaviro, Economic Substance, Corporate
Tax Shelters, and the Compaq Case, 88 TAX NOTES 221 (July 10, 2000) (explaining
that a function of the economic substance doctrine is to impose frictions on aggressive
tax planning). My point is that uncertainty in the tax laws can produce excessive
friction which may alter or inhibit transactions that are welfare enhancing.
69 For a formal analysis of the effects of tax law and tax enforcement uncertainty
on reported income and on aggregate social welfare, see Suzanne Scotchmer & Joel
Slemrod, Randomness in Tax Enforcement, 38 J. PUB. ECON. 17 (1989). The authors
do not argue that behavioral effects of tax law uncertainty will precisely offset the
behavioral effects of insufficient penalties. They do note, however, that the two can
act as substitutes for each other.
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planning, since some taxpayers will be induced to over-comply and
others, the less risk-averse, will be inclined to take a chance and
exploit the ambiguity. In addition, there are better responses to tax
under-compliance than the use of legal uncertainty. For example, the
best response to suboptimal penalties or suboptimal detection rates is
70 Thus, maybe we should
to increase one or the other, or both.
radically increase tax understatement penalties or spend more money
on auditors, hiring more of them and training them better.71 If we
take either of those steps, however, we would be right back where we
started with the problem of legal uncertainty and the accompanying
distortions and inequities due to potential over-compliance. Even if
we fix the problem of under-deterrence by choosing the optimal
balance of detection risk and penalties, we will still need to deal with
the problem of legal uncertainty. What I want to explore in the
remainder of this Article is a particular response to substantive legal
uncertainty, a form of private insurance that has in recent years come
into use by mostly sophisticated corporate taxpayers. In particular, I
explore in some detail the benefits and costs of tax transaction
insurance, and I compare it with the most obvious alternative:
government provided legal uncertainty insurance. As we will see,
insofar as tax insurance operates purely as coverage for substantive
legal uncertainty or coverage for merits risk, it appears to be socially
desirable. However, insofar as it operates as insurance against pure
detection risk - i.e., if taxpayers were to buy coverage for tax
positions that they knew were contrary to prevailing law - tax
insurance may be problematic and perhaps should be limited or
banned.
Before I get to these arguments, however, let us review some of
the facts about the existing market in tax insurance. First, I will take a
brief detour to describe what might be called the old markets in tax
insurance, which still thrive today, and then I will survey the new
market, which is much smaller in scope at this point but is in many
ways more interesting for its potential.

70 Scotchmer and Slemrod demonstrate, however, that, under certain restrictive
assumptions, the socially optimal level of tax law uncertainty is greater than zero.
The intuition behind this point is that a marginal increase in tax law uncertainty can
have the same deterrent effect on taxpayer reporting behavior as a more expensive
investment in increased detection. Id. at 24-25. They would presumably agree,
however, that there is a ceiling to the optimal amount of tax law uncertainty.
71 My own view is that we should do both.
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Ill. THE OLD MARKET IN TAX INSURANCE: TAX PREPARER (AND

TAX ADVISOR) WARRANTIES AND TAX INDEMNITY AGREEMENTS

This Part discusses three forerunners of tax transaction insurance:
tax preparer warranties; tax advisor warranties, or contingent fee
arrangements; and tax indemnity agreements. The first is discussed at
some length, the latter two only briefly. Although these warranties
differ from each other and from tax risk insurance, each involves some
degree of shifting of tax law uncertainty from one party to another
and thus can be understood as a form of tax insurance. What is
especially interesting is that from the perspective of the Treasury
Department, preparer warranties and indemnity agreements present
no tax law enforcement concerns, whereas advisor warranties do.
Why this is so is a question explored below.72
A. Tax Preparer Warranties
Long before there were tax indemnity insurance policies, there
was a type of tax insurance that is still sold to millions of individual
taxpayers today. These are the warranties provided by tax return
preparers for their clients.73 Although the content of these warranties
varies from one tax preparer to another, there is a considerable
degree of overlap.74 The typical preparer warranty provides that if the
72

See infra text accompanying notes 85-89.
73 Under state insurance laws, the regulatory definition of the term "insurance"
does not typically encompass service or product warranties. See, e.g. , State ex rel.
Duffy v. W. Auto Supply Co., 16 N.E.2d 256, 259 (Ohio 1938) ("A warranty promises
indemnity against defects in the article sold, while insurance indemnifies against loss
or damage resulting from perils outside of and unrelated to defects in the article
itself."). This means that those companies issuing warranties need not qualify as
insurance companies or meet all of the requirements, including solvency
requirements, imposed on such companies by state law. I have found one instance,
however, in which a state insurance regulator treated a particular tax preparer
warranty as insurance for state insurance regulatory purposes. Office of Gen.
Counsel, State of N.Y. Ins. Dep't., Treatment of Tax Preparer's Warranty (2000),
available at http://www.ins.state.ny.us/rg003281.htm (concluding that any tax preparer
warranty that covered losses beyond those caused by preparer errors would constitute
insurance for regulatory purposes.)
74 For the purposes of this study, I have focused on the warranties provided by
H&R Block and Jackson Hewitt that are publicly available on their respective web
sites. H&R Block, Professional Services, http://www.hrblock.com/taxes/products/
product.jsp?productld=43&otpPartnerid=2054&Partnerid=2054 (describing H&R
Block's "Peace of Mind" warranty); Jackson Hewitt, Tax Liability Protection,
http.!lwww.jacksonhewitt.com/products_gold.asp (describing Jackson Hewitt's "Gold
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preparer makes a mistake in preparing the taxpayer's return and that
error results in the Service's assessing interest and penalty charges
against the taxpayer, the preparer will cover those additional costs.
Most preparers further narrow the standard coverage by specifying
that the coverage is triggered only by calculation errors on the
preparer's part; some preparers, however, are less specific about
precisely what sort of error will trigger coverage.
In any event, the standard tax preparer warranty typically limits
coverage to preparer errors of some kind and thus leaves taxpayers
themselves responsible for any interest or penalties caused by their
own mistakes or malfeasance. For example, if a taxpayer fails to tell
the tax preparer of some item of gross income that she received in a
given year and the preparer leaves that item off the taxpayer's return,
or if the taxpayer simply provides incorrect numbers with respect to
some item of income or deduction, any resulting penalties and interest
would be the responsibility of the taxpayer. If the preparer commits
an error, however, the standard warranty covers any resulting penalty
and interest. This standard warranty is provided by most tax
preparation firms and most tax preparation web sites and software
companies; and the price for this coverage is typically included in the
basic cost of the service.75
Conspicuously absent from the standard tax preparer warranty is
coverage for underpaid taxes. That is, they cover penalties and
interest but not the underpaid taxes themselves. This is not to say that
tax underpayment warranties are never offered. They are, but they

Guarantee" warranty). According to one source, H&R Block and Jackson Hewitt
together handle roughly sixteen percent of all individual federal income tax returns
filed with the Service. ALAN BERUBE ET AL., CI'R. ON URBAN & METRO. POLICY, THE
BROOKINGS INSTITUTION & THE PROGRESSIVE POLICY INST., THE PRICE OF PAYING
TAXES: How TAX PREPARATION AND REFUND LOAN FEES ERODE THE BENEFITS OF
THE EITC 4 (2002), available at http://www.brookings.edu/es/urban/publications/
berubekimeitc.pdf (reviewing data from companies' annual reports). In addition to
the H&R Block and Jackson Hewitt examples, I have spoken with several
accountants, as well as with others familiar with the tax preparation industry, about
the use and typical content of tax preparer warranties.
75 For example, Turbo Tax provides the following standard warranty with its
online product: "We are so confident in the accuracy of TurboTax for the Web that
it's 100% Guaranteed Accurate. Rest assured, if you ever have to pay an IRS or state
penalty or interest because of a TurboTax calculations error, we'll pay you the
penalty and
interest."
TurboTax
Guaranteed
100%
Accurate,
http://www.turbotax.com/tax_products/turbotax_advantages/guaranteed_accurate_onl
ine_tax_prep.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2005).

378

Virginia Tax Review

[Vol. 25:339

are generally offered separately as a "rider" to the basic warranty.76
Furthermore, although tax deficiency coverage is offered by some
preparers, it would not be surprising if taxpayers rarely opted to buy
it. It is not that tax deficiencies are never large and unpredictable
enough to motivate a demand for insurance. Indeed, as will be
discussed in the next Part, it is the risk of a large unexpected tax
deficiency, rather than the risk of penalties, that seems to generate
most of the recent demand for tax indemnity insurance.77 The biggest
difference between the tax indemnity or tax transaction insurance
market and the market for tax preparation warranties is the relative
magnitude of the risks. For most individual taxpayers who have a
return preparer do their returns, as compared to the corporate
taxpayers who are purchasing tax indemnity policies, the amount of
the potential tax deficiency is relatively small, not only in absolute
terms but relative to the overall tax liability. A major reason for this
is that most individual taxpayers - and certainly the ones who have
hired tax return preparers to file their returns - are not likely to be
engaged in some sort of aggressive shelter transaction, which by
definition puts substantial tax dollars at risk. Rather, they have
decided to use a professional preparer or tax preparation software
because they find the tax laws to be too complex to manage on their
own. Such taxpayers typically do not go to return preparers for tax
shelter advice, but only for help in preparing their returns.78
Moreover, individual taxpayers who decide to take aggressive
positions on their returns may do so regardless of the advice of their
preparers. This suggests another reason why return preparation firms
would be reluctant to provide coverage against tax deficiencies. That
76 Both H&R Block and Jackson Hewitt, for example, offer special extended
warranties that, for an additional fee, provide coverage for underpaid taxes. In both
cases, however, the amount of coverage for underpaid taxes is capped
$5,000 for
H&R Block and $6,000 for Jackson Hewitt. Also, in both cases, coverage is triggered
by the preparer's error. Thus, combining both the standard and the extended
warranties, if an H&R Block or Jackson Hewitt tax return preparer makes an error
on a return, either a computational error or an error in interpreting the law, and the
Service catches this mistake and issues a deficiency notice to the taxpayer requiring
additional taxes plus interest and penalties, the company will pay all of the penalties
and interest, as under the standard warranty, plus up to the policy limits in back taxes.
n Few, if any, of the types of transactions that have been the subject of tax
transaction insurance are of the sort that would be likely to give rise to penalties.
78 This conclusion, which is my own educated guess, does not mean that the use
of return preparers overall necessarily enhances the accuracy of tax filings. There is,
in fact, literature on this question, and the answer is that it depends. See infra note 80
and accompanying text.
-
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is, if the risks are large, tax preparation firms may simply not be
willing to take on the extra risk. Put differently, just as most product
manufacturers would prefer not to become insurers for the
consequential harms associated with their products and thus typically
attempt to disclaim such warranties, it is possible that many tax return
preparers simply do not wish to become the insurers of their
customers' overall tax liability.
In addition, even if the tax
preparation firms were willing to take on the additional risk, they may
not wish to take on the extra regulatory burdens, including licensure
and solvency requirements, associated with being "engaged in the
business of insurance" for state regulatory purposes. Such regulatory
burdens would be more likely if the return preparer sold tax
deficiency coverage in addition to the basic warranties.79
A final observation about tax preparer warranties is that they also
typically include a modest commitment to assist the taxpayer in the
event of an audit. This guarantee entails a promise to help the
taxpayer in the event of an audit to answer basic questions regarding
how his or her return was prepared and how the various numbers
were calculated. The guarantee, however, specifically declines to
promise full-fledged legal representation; to the contrary, it expressly
disclaims that obligation. Interestingly, tax preparers also sometimes
guarantee that if the taxpayer overpays his or her taxes and does so as
a result of the preparer's error (typically, only if it is a calculation
error), the preparer will assist in filing an amended return to recover
the excess taxes paid and will reimburse the taxpayer for any interest
on that amount. Thus, tax insurance against errors on the part of tax
preparers, which again has been in existence for some time, can be
symmetrical, covering calculation errors in both directions.
The foregoing is a rough picture of the market for tax preparation
warranties. In their current form, these warranties have certain
characteristics that are common to other service and product
warranties, characteristics that suggest the contracts are harmless and
perhaps even socially beneficial. However, under certain conditions,
one can imagine that these warranties, like other "small print"
language in standard form contracts, might present consumer
protection issues. That is, if the consumers who purchase the
warranties are asymmetrically uninformed or systematically
misperceive the risks being insured, government regulation may be
appropriate. The case for such intervention would be no different
from that for other consumer product warranties. This sort of
79

See Office of Gen. Counsel, State of N.Y. Ins. Dep't., supra note 73.
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regulation is typically done at the state level either by state attorneys
general enforcing state consumer protection laws or by state insurance
regulators if the warranties happen to qualify as insurance.
The more pertinent question for the purposes of this Article is
whether tax preparation warranties - at least the ones comparable to
those offered by the large tax preparation firms - present any tax law
enforcement or compliance concerns. The answer seems to be that,
although the use of tax preparers may have some negative effects on
taxpayer compliance (as well as some positive effects), there is no
obvious compliance cost or benefit associated with the warranties per
se. That is, the existence of these warranties probably does not by
itself create an incentive for insured taxpayers to take overly
aggressive positions on their tax returns. Whether an individual
taxpayer's use of expert assistance in preparing a tax return leads to
increased or reduced compliance is a question that has been studied
by economists. Within that literature, one of the more interesting
hypotheses is that tax return preparers, and perhaps tax advisors more
generally, (a) tend to increase compliance with complex but clear legal
rules but (b) tend to reduce compliance or increase noncompliance
with rules that are more ambiguous or uncertain. Put differently, tax
preparers are "rule enforcers" and "ambiguity exploiters."80 With
respect to clear but complex rules, individual, presumably
unsophisticated taxpayers may inadvertently fail to comply simply
from lack of understanding. In those cases, hired tax experts, who are
able to decipher these complex rules and wish to avoid tax preparer
penalties, will tend to correct such inadvertent clear errors, producing
greater overall compliance with such provisions. For this optimistic
conclusion to follow, it must be assumed that (a) return preparers are
better able to understand such complex provisions than can the
taxpayers who hire them, and (b) although the rules are complex they
are clear, giving tax experts an incentive to counsel in favor of
compliance.
This latter assumption would hold because
noncompliance in this context would in effect amount to evasion,
which would subject not only the taxpayer but the preparer to near
certain, potentially severe penalties in the event of audit. By contrast,
where the legal requirements are more ambiguous - or, to use the
language from the previous Part, more standard-like - the overall
80 See, e.g. , Brian Erard , Taxation with Representation: An Analysis of the Role
of Tax Practitioners in Tax Compliance, 52 J. PUB. ECON. 163, 164 (1993); Steven
Klepper et al., Expert Intermediaries and Legal Compliance: The Case of Tax
Preparers; 34 J.L. & ECON. 205, 207 (1991); Steven Klepper & Daniel Nagin, The Role
of Tax Preparers in Tax Compliance, 22 POLICY Sci. 167 (1989).

2005]

Tax Law Uncertainty and Tax Insurance

381

effect on compliance rates of using a preparer may cut in the opposite
direction. This would be true if unsophisticated individual taxpayers
tend to react to ambiguity by over-complying - if, for example, they
do not take deductions to which they are not sure they are entitled.
On the other hand, sophisticated tax preparers react to the same
ambiguity less risk-aversely and are willing to take calculated risk. In
terms of the tax compliance continuum in Figure 1 above, many
unsophisticated, risk-averse individual taxpayers may tend to stay
relatively close to Point B. By contrast, return preparers, better able
to make the probabilistic calculations necessary to avoid penalties due
to their superior tax expertise, may be more likely to take positions
closer to Point C. There is at least some evidence to suggest that these
conditions do hold in some settings and that the rule
enforcer/ambiguity-exploiter hypothesis may have some real world
validity, although the evidence is not beyond dispute and the policy
implications are not clear.
In any event, whatever the outcome of that debate, it does not
bear directly on the question of warranties or insurance. Whether
paid preparers on balance have good, bad, or no effects on taxpayer
compliance decisions overall, the fact that preparers tend to provide
warranties for their work by itself does not yet seem to present a large
tax compliance problem. Indeed, the Treasury Department has
completely ignored these tax preparer warranties, presumably on the
assumption that they pose no serious threat to the fisc. 81 The one way
in which such warranties might present a problem would be if the
promise of tax penalty insurance/warranties induced taxpayers to take
more aggressive positions or to allow their return preparers to take
more aggressive positions on their behalf. This is certainly possible.
Just as aggressive tax planning can be in the self-interest of both
sophisticated taxpayers and their advisors, it can also be in the self
interest of average individual taxpayers and their return preparers to
be aggressive; and the use of warranties could conceivably encourage
this sort of behavior. However, it is unlikely that this would become a
significant tax compliance problem for middle or lower income
taxpayers who use the large return preparation firms. These are not
taxpayers with the resources or incentives to engage in complex quasi
legal tax shelter transactions of the sort that would appeal to wealthy
or corporate taxpayers who (a) have more absolute tax dollars and a
81

As we shall see in a moment, however, the Treasury Department has not been
as sanguine about what I call tax advisor warranties. See infra text accompanying
notes 82-89.
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higher percentage of their income at stake in the tax avoidance game
and (b) can hire expensive tax lawyers and accountants to help them
with their tax planning. Moreover, given the nature of the wholesale
tax preparation business, tax return preparation firms are simply not
in a position to provide this sort of complicated tax shelter planning
advice.
In sum, a case can be made that tax preparer warranties efficiently
allocate the risk of tax preparer mistake to the obvious cheapest-cost
avoider and best insurer, the tax preparer. Moreover, at least with
respect to the large retail tax preparation firms, there seem to be
relatively few tax compliance problems associated with the use of
warranties, although whether the use of tax return preparers itself
increases or decreases compliance is an open question.
B. Tax Advisor Warranties (a. k.a. Contingent Fee Arrangements)
Tax return preparers are not the only tax professionals providing
implicit or explicit service warranties. Based on my conversations
with tax attorneys and accountants, a type of warranty is also
sometimes provided by tax advisors who provide taxpayers with
expert opinions as to the appropriate or likely tax treatment of
particular transactions.82 These warranties have some attributes in
common with return preparation warranties and some attributes in
common with tax transaction insurance, although they are different in
important respects as well. Like tax transaction insurance, these
warranties apply to specific opinions offered by the advisor with
respect to particular tax issues; they do not apply to the taxpayer's
entire tax return. Tax preparer warranties by contrast apply to the
entire return, as the preparation of the entire return is the service
being warranted. Like tax preparer warranties, however, tax advisor
warranties offer less-than-full indemnity for losses. That is, unlike tax
indemnity or tax transaction insurance policies, tax advisor warranties
do not cover taxpayers against the possibility of penalties, interest, or
82 By "tax advisor" here I mean someone who advises a taxpayer regarding (a)
how to structure a given transaction so as to minimize taxes, and then (b) how to
report that transaction on the taxpayer's return. The advisor therefore is providing
expertise on the tax law as it applies to a particular situation and is involved in so
called tax planning. By "tax return preparer" I mean someone who fills out the tax
return itself. Obviously, the preparer may give some legal advice on how to report
certain issues; thus, the distinction does not always hold up. One can still usefully
distinguish, however, between the H&R Blocks of the world and the lawyers and
accountants that give more specialized transactional advice on specific issues, usually
to corporate or wealthy individual taxpayers.

2005]

Tax Law Uncertainty and Tax Insurance

383

tax deficiencies themselves, but take the form of a money-back
guarantee: if the particular issue on which the advisor gave an opinion
ends up being challenged on audit and rejected by the Service and a
court, the advisor agrees to refund some or all of the fees that were
charged for the advice.83 Such an arrangement can be an explicit
element of the service contract between the advisor and the taxpayer.
It is more likely to be part of an implicit understanding, however.84
In effect, these tax advisor warranties amount to a form of
contingent fee arrangement for tax advisors.85 What is interesting is
that the Treasury Department apparently regards such arrangements
as presenting significant tax compliance concerns. This can be seen in
Circular 230, the regulations governing the standards of practice
before the Service, which specifically prohibits those admitted to
practice before the Service from using contingent fee arrangements,
except in circumstances in which the advisor is giving advice with
respect to an amended return.86 Relatedly, the Treasury Regulations
83 There may also be implicit arrangements under which tax advisors agree to
indemnify the taxpayers against back taxes, interest, and penalties in the event the
Service disallows a particular tax issue. Something like this was involved in Clark v.
Commissioner, although that may have been a one-time spontaneous transfer and not
part of an implicit indemnification contract. 40 B .T.A. 333 (1939), nonacq. 1939-2
C.B. 45; nonacq. withdrawn and acq. , 1957-2 C.B. 3. I suspect, however, that such
indemnification arrangements are rare. An alternative version of this type of tax
advisor indemnification would be the existence of potential legal malpractice claims
against tax advisors who issue advice that is below industry standards. Given how low
industry standards have fallen, however, this coverage is largely illusory except in the
most egregious shelter cases.
84 As far as I am aware, there is no published data on the prevalence of these
arrangements. I have been told by some tax lawyers that it is common. Other
lawyers have told me, however, that these arrangements are common only among
shelter promoters, which would explain why the Treasury Department is so
concerned about these arrangements. Again, the distinction between a tax shelter
and mere tax planning is notoriously difficult to draw.
85 Most lawyers think of contingent fee arrangements as having the following
structure: the lawyer gets paid a percentage of the favorable outcome, which in a tax
case would be the "tax savings" from the transaction in question. However, such an
arrangement could be structured as follows: the tax advisor charges an hourly rate or
a set fee for given transaction, and if the tax characterization of the transaction is
disallowed by the Service and Courts, the advisor must refund a portion or all of the
fees. Either approach is a form of contingent fee arrangement and could be
structured to provide identical incentives and risk allocation.
86 In those regulations, a contingent fee is defined as follows:

[A] contingent fee is any fee that is based, in whole or in part, on whether
or not a position taken on a tax return or other filing avoids challenge by
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that define the category of tax shelter transactions that taxpayers are
required to flag for the Service as so-called "reportable transactions"
include transactions that have "contractual protection," which
87
essentially means those involving contingent fee arrangements.
These two sets of regulations - Circular 230 and the reportable
transaction regulations - seem to work together as follows: tax
advisors who want to maintain their ability to practice before the
Service and avoid Circular 230 penalties may not charge contingency
fees or structure their fees in any way to provide contractual
protection on a "reportable transaction,'' as defined under Code

the Internal Revenue Service or is sustained either by the Internal Revenue
Service or in litigation. A contingent fee includes any fee arrangement in
which the practitioner will reimburse the client for all or a portion of the
client's fee in the event that a position taken on a tax return or other filing
is challenged by the Internal Revenue Service or is not sustained, whether
pursuant to an indemnity agreement, a guarantee, rescission rights, or any
other arrangement with a similar effect.
31 C.F.R. § 10.27(b)(l) (2002). Circular 230 then provides:
A practitioner may not charge a contingent fee for preparing an original tax
return or for any advice rendered in connection with a position taken or to
be taken on an original tax return.
. . . A contingent fee may be charged for preparation of or advice in
connection with an amended tax return or a claim for refund (other than a
claim for refund made on an original tax return), but only if the practitioner
reasonably anticipates at the time the fee arrangement is entered into that
the amended tax return or refund claim will receive substantive review by
the Internal Revenue Service.
Id. § 10.27(b)(2)-(3).
87 Treas. Reg. § 1 .6011-4 (2003) requires taxpayers to report transactions that
involve "contractual protection," which is defined as follows:
A transaction with contractual protection is a transaction for which the
taxpayer or a related party . . . has the right to a full or partial refund of fees
(as described in paragraph (b)(4)(ii) of this section) if all or part of the
intended tax consequences from the transaction are not sustained. A
transaction with contractual protection also is a transaction for which fees
(as described in paragraph (b)(4)(ii) of this section) are contingent on the
taxpayer's realization of tax benefits from the transaction. All the facts and
circumstances relating to the transaction will be considered when
determining whether a fee is refundable or contingent, including the right
to reimbursements of amounts that the parties to the transaction have not
designated as fees or any agreement to provide services without reasonable
compensation.
Id. § l.6011-4(b)(4)(i).
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section 601 1, even if the transaction is reported to the Service by the
taxpayer, unless the transaction involves a claim for a refund. If the
transaction involves a claim for a refund, however, not only is a
contingent fee arrangement allowed, there is an exception to the
reporting requirement for the taxpayer as well. In any event, the
Treasury Department seems to be concerned about contingent fee or
warranty arrangements between tax advisors and taxpayers but is
apparently not the least concerned about tax preparer warranties of
88
the sort described above that promise, not reimbursement of fees,
but coverage of back taxes, penalties, and interest.89 The difference in
Treasury concern probably makes some sense, because of differences
. in the two markets. Tax return preparers are dealing with relatively
simple returns for mostly low and middle income individuals and are
less likely to be involved in aggressive shelter-type activity; whereas at
least some tax advisors are actively working in the tax shelter market.
Indeed, some lawyers have told me that the only tax advisors who use
contingent fee arrangements are those involved in shelter activity. In
any event, the concern with these regulations is that they are over
inclusive and require reporting, or have the effect of forbidding
contingent fees, in circumstances in which there is no special concern
about aggressive avoidance. I will return to this issue below after I
have outlined the nature of and problems with the tax transaction or
tax indemnity insurance market.
C. Tax Indemnity Agreements
Although tax preparer and tax advisor warranties have some
aspects in common with tax indemnity insurance policies, if there is a
single forerunner of the new market in tax insurance, it is the humble
tax indemnity agreement, which is often structured as a special
addendum to the standard "Representations and Warranties" section
of most buy-sell agreements. So-called tax indemnity provisions have
long been a part of contracts involving the purchase and sale of
businesses; and it is not difficult to see why: Whenever one business
acquires, merges with, or purchases another, there will always be some
legal uncertainty that needs to be allocated. And one of the parties to
the deal is likely to be in a better position to bear the risk. For
example, the seller may, for whatever reason, be especially risk-averse
and thus may wish to shed any risk of environmental liability that
88

See supra text accompanying notes 73-81.
Neither Circular 230 nor any other regulations address tax preparer
warranties. See 31 C.F.R..§ 10.27 (2002).
89
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might accompany the business that it is selling. Indeed, that may be a
main reason behind the sale. In that case, the seller might enter into a
contractual arrangement shifting primary responsibility for
environmental liability risks to the purchaser - in effect, making the
purchaser the insurer of the environmental liabilities of the target
business. Alternatively, the buyer may be more risk-averse and may
want to avoid assuming any unknown environmental risks from the
seller. Thus, the buyer may insist that the seller assume responsibility
for those risks before closing the deal. Which of the parties will be the
one to whom the risk is allocated will depend on a number of factors,
including who is the better risk bearer - i.e., who has more assets
over which to spread the potential loss or who has better access to
capital markets - or who has better information about the risk. As
mentioned, such indemnity agreements are common in transactions
involving business purchases or mergers. Tax law risk is commonly
allocated in the same way. Contracting parties frequently allocate
between them the responsibility for potential tax liabilities through
the use of tax indemnity agreements that become an integral part of
the overall transaction.9()
As we shall see in the next Part, tax indemnity or tax transaction
insurance policies can be viewed as the next logical step in the
evolution of these contracts. That is, instead of shifting the legal risk
from buyer to seller or vice versa the strategy now is to shift that risk
to a third-party insurer. Especially interesting is that although such
contractual efforts to shift legal risk between buyers and sellers have
been around for a long time, they do not seem to have been a source
of regulatory scrutiny. With regard to tax indemnity agreements
specifically, nothing suggests that the Service or the Treasury has any
90 Lewis
M. Horowitz, Excludability of Tax Indemnification Payments
Threatened by Recent Change in IRS Position: PLR 9014046, 49 TAX NOTES 799, 799
(Nov. 12, 1990) (observing that tax indemnity agreements are used when "one party
represents to the other that certain tax benefits will be derived under the contract.
Because the anticipated tax treatment usually affects the economic viability of the
contractual arrangement, the representing party typically indemnifies the other in the
event the represented tax benefits are not realized."); Robert W. Wood & Dominic L.
Daher, Beating a Dead Horse: Tax Indemnity Payments to Ex-Spouses, 101 TAX
NOTES 875, 875 (Nov. 17, 2003) ("Tax indemnity payments are common features of
many transactions, such as litigation settlement agreements, merger documents,
purchase and sale agreements, leases, and so forth. Regardless of the context, in
general, they say: 'If you get taxed as a result of the transaction, I'll cover it."'). A
sample of a tax indemnity agreement can be found online: FindLaw - Tax Allocation
and Indemnity Agreement, http://contracts.corporate.findlaw.com/agreements/
parkplace/hilton.tax.1998.12.31 .htrnl (last visited Oct. 5, 2005).
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concerns about such transactions. The same cannot be said, however,
for tax indemnity insurance.
IV .

THE NEW MARKET IN TAX INSURANCE

Tax indemnity or transactional tax risk insurance policies differ
from traditional tax preparer or tax advisor warranties and tax
indemnity agreements in several respects. First, tax insurance policies
are not warranties. Neither are they merely contractual agreements
that allocate risks between two parties who are also contracting on
other issues. Rather, tax indemnity policies are, as the name suggests,
full-fledged insurance policies issued by real insurance companies that
are regulated as such. Thus, when a tax insurance policy is purchased,
certain tax risks are transferred to an insurance company, which then
pools and distributes the risks across its other insureds and which
sometimes reinsures some portion of those risks with other insurance
companies. A second general difference between tax risk insurance
and preparer warranties in particular is that the former are not mass
marketed in standardized forms to individuals for relatively small
risks, as are tax preparer warranties.
Rather, tax transaction
insurance is a type of custom-designed and individually-negotiated
insurance. It is sold exclusively to wealthy and commercially
sophisticated, typically corporate taxpayers seeking to cover large tax
related risks - potential tax liabilities in the millions, tens of millions,
and even hundreds of millions of dollars. That the policies are
individually negotiated in this way may have consequences for how
courts will interpret the language of the contracts, as courts sometimes
treat standard form insurance contracts differently from individually
negotiated ones. Finally, as already mentioned and as will be
discussed further below, although tax preparer warranties cover an
entire tax return, tax transaction policies are written on a transaction
specific basis. They generally cover the tax treatment of particular tax
_
transactions; they generally are not written to cover entire tax returns.
A. The Content of Tax Insurance Policies
Because they are not standard form contracts, it is difficult to
describe the typical tax insurance policy. Nevertheless, there are
enough important features in common that some general descriptive
91
comments are possible. As already mentioned, tax insurance is a
91 My knowledge of the tax indemnity insurance market and the content of the
policies themselves derives from numerous conversations with individuals in the

388

Virginia Tax Review

[Vol. 25:339

form of liability insurance, where the liability risk is that of
unexpected tax liabilities and penalties. Thus, tax insurance policies
cover the risk that the Service will rule unfavorably with respect to
some tax position that the taxpayer has taken or plans to take on its
tax return. In this sense, then, tax insurance is a form of government
sanction insurance. The policies typically cover the amount of the tax
deficiency as well as any interest and penalties that are assessed up to
the limits of the policy. These policy limits are set to equal a
substantial fraction, sometimes all, of the potential tax liability,
penalties, interest, and legal fees that might be incurred if the
transaction in question is disallowed. Thus, for large corporate
taxpayers, the policy limits can be in the hundreds of millions of
dollars, although limits in the tens of millions are more common. The
policies typically provide full "gross ups," which means that insofar as
the insurance payouts themselves are considered income for tax
purposes, the insurer will cover that additional tax as well and the
resulting additional tax liability, and so on, "grossing up" the overall
payment until the taxpayer is made whole on an after-tax basis. In
this way the insurance aims to leave the taxpayer whole with respect
to the risk of a negative tax ruling, with one exception: As do virtually
all commercial liability insurance policies, tax indemnity policies
include a substantial deductible, which is intended to help reduce
moral hazard concerns.92
insurance industry who are involved in the design and marketing of these policies as
well as with a number of tax lawyers who either have been hired to provide legal
opinions to insurance companies or taxpayers regarding the purchase of such
insurance. In addition, I have read many sample policies that were sent to me by
insurers or by insurance brokers or that I downloaded directly from insurance
company websites. To view a description of the nature and function of tax risk
insurance and to see a model policy, see Am. Int'! Group, Inc., M&A North America:
Tax Liability Insurance, http://www.aigmergerrisks.com/northamerica_tax.html (last
visited Oct. 5, 2005). For the best published source on the nature and content of tax
risk insurance policies by a tax practitioner, see generally Wolfe, supra note 1 .
92 A n interesting question, which cannot b e answered fully i n this Article, is
whether a tax insurance premium is a deductible business expense and whether the
proceeds from such policies are excludible from gross income. Commercial insurance
premiums, including liability insurance premiums, paid by business taxpayers are
generally considered ordinary and necessary business expenses under Code section
162. Thus, they are generally deductible, subject to the economic performance rules
under Code section 461(h) and subject to capitalization rules for multi-year policies.
But what about tax liability insurance? It might be argued that the insurance
premiums ought not be deductible, since the insurance is to cover payments which, if
made by the taxpayer, would not be deductible (i.e., income tax payments). My
guess, however, is that most taxpayers that purchase tax risk policies are deducting
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As with standard commercial liability insurance policies, tax
transaction policies offer coverage for the legal and accounting costs
of contesting the tax liability, although the language here is different
from a standard commercial liability policy. For example, although
the policies clearly provide for coverage of some of the legal costs of
defending the tax position against government challenge, sometimes
called "contest expenses," they also state clearly that "the insurer has
no duty to defend" the insured, which is a standard part of most
liability insurance policies.93 Tax transaction policies are written
exclusively on a claims-made basis; that is, they cover only losses for
which claims are made during the policy term, which is typically three
years - or the length of standard statute of limitations for the Service
to issue a "notice of proposed adjustment" - but can be longer. The
policies also contain provisions requiring the insured-taxpayer to
notify the insurer in the event of a claim and to cooperate with the
insurer in the event of an insured loss - all standard terms in liability
policies. The policies typically contain subrogation clauses, which
transfer to the insurance company the taxpayer's potential
malpractice claim against the tax advisor who rendered an opinion for
the tax transaction in question.
As mentioned above, tax insurance policies are usually sold on a

the premiums. As for the receipt of the insurance payouts in the event of an adverse
decision by the Service, although Clark v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 33 (1939),
nonacq. 1939-2 C.B. 45; nonacq. withdrawn and acq. , 1957-2 C.B. 3, might be cited in
favor of exclusion, the Service would likely take the position that the payouts must be
included. Clark involved a payment received by a taxpayer from a tax preparer to
cover a tax liability that was, in effect, the result of the preparer's negligence; that is,
the tax would not have been owed had the preparer not made the mistake. Tax risk
insurance is different. With tax risk insurance, payments are made by an insurer to
cover taxes that the taxpayer would have owed anyway. At least, that is the argument
the Service would likely make. See, e.g. , l.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 98-33-007 (May 13,
1998) (concluding that tax indemnity payments received by taxpayer from tax
advisor's malpractice carrier must be included in gross income because
reimbursement is for no more than the "minimum proper federal income tax liability
based on the transaction for the tax year to which the tax reimbursement relates").
9 3 It is not entirely clear what the difference is between assuming a duty to
defend, which is what liability policies typically do but tax insurance policies do not,
and agreeing only to cover "contest expenses." This distinction may be an effort by
insurers in drafting the policies to avoid state common law responsibilities that attach
to the duty to defend. Relatedly, tax insurance policies typically give the insured
taxpayer the right to choose the lawyer to contest the Service determination and to
direct the case, but they impose a generally worded obligation on the insured
taxpayer to conduct the case as if there were no insurance in place, and they require
consultation with the insurer on settlement negotiations.
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transaction-specific basis - that is, to cover the tax risk associated
with a single transaction, hence the term "transactional tax risk
insurance." Thus, such insurance is much less often sold to cover a
corporate taxpayer's entire tax return and all of the tax risks
contained therein, although this does happen on occasion. This is
another difference between tax indemnity insurance and tax preparer
warranties, which, though much more modest in the amount of
coverage, do apply to the entire return. Most commercial liability
insurance policies, by contrast, cover the insured for a wide range of
risks for given period of coverage. The rationale for the transaction
specific structure of tax insurance seems clear: to provide the insurer a
way of limiting its exposure to particular tax positions that the insurer
- and its tax law experts - have been able to examine, assess,
approve, and ultimately price.94 These policies also contain a number
of exclusions, including exclusions for fraud or for any false
representations made by the insured to the insurer during the
underwriting process. Premiums charged for tax insurance range
between five and fifteen percent of the amount of the policy limits.95
Assuming this market is reasonably competitive, we should expect
that the premium for any given insured would approximate that
insured's expected liability for back taxes, interest, and penalties, or
the sum of those amounts discounted by the probability of prevailing
on the merits, discounted further by the probability that the position
being insured will avoid detection by the Service.96
If tax risk insurance is primarily transactional insurance, one
might reasonably ask what sorts of transactions are currently being
insured. As it turns out, there is a wide range of tax situations, mostly
- though not exclusively - involving corporations that have been the
subject of tax risk policies, examples of which were described in Part
1.97 One way of understanding this range of insurable tax transactions
94 It is through this underwriting process that insurance companies can, at least
in theory, assist in the enforcement of the tax laws. See infra Part V.
95

Wolfe, supra note 1, at 618.
In a competitive market, insurance premiums should be slightly greater than
the expected value of total claim payouts. Because insureds are risk-averse, they will
pay slightly more than the expected value.
97 At the web site advertising their tax risk product, AIG lists the following
situations as "potential opportunities for tax liability insurance":
96

•

•

Protection of the tax-free status of corporate spin-offs, split-ups or split
offs (Section 355);
Tax consequences resulting from a change in ownership (for example, tax
free mergers under Section 368);
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is to divide them into two general categories: (1) insurance that is
purchased to cover a taxpayer's own tax risks, and (2) insurance that is
purchased to cover the tax risks associated with the purchase, sale, or
exchange by the taxpayer of some entity or assets. Included in the
first category would be the situation in which a corporation, prior to
issuing its initial public offering of stock, decides to purchase a tax risk
insurance policy to cover some previous transaction, on the theory
that this move will maximize the offering price.98 The theory is that
the capital markets need to be reassured about the tax position of the
corporation in question. Recall, this is the risk-averse-investor story
mentioned above.99 A different example of the first type of tax risk
insurance is the policy that covers some tax issue that has already
been raised by the Service, perhaps in a 30-day letter. 100 What makes
this type of insurance especially interesting is that it is a form of
"retroactive insurance," a rare and highly specialized type of
insurance that is, by definition, sold only after the loss event has
occurred but while there is still substantial uncertainty as to the case's
outcome. 101 Thus, retroactive tax insurance is purchased only after the
•

Successor liability issues in the context of M&A transactions where, due to
joint and several liability issues, an acquirer is concerned about a historic
tax position taken by the target company or its consolidated tax group;

•

Tax liability arising from a potential loss of "S" corporation status;

•

Certain tax issues arising from Section 1031 "like-kind" exchanges;

•

•

•

•

•

Certain tax issues related to the determination of the allowable net
operating losses in a "change of control" context (Section 382);
Certain tax issues arising from golden parachute payments under Section
280G;
Tax liability resulting from deferred compensation arrangements that may
be subject to challenge via the constructive receipt doctrine;
Tax liability arising out of an employee's use of non-recourse debt to
finance a purchase of his employer's stock; and

Tax liability arising from an employee's receipt of discounted
compensatory stock options.
AIG Mergers & Acquisitions Ins. Group, Tax Liability Insurance Product Highlight
Sheet, http://www.aigmergerrisks.com!files/M&A/TAX_NA_-_Product_Highlight
_Sheet.pd/ (last visited Sept. 17, 2005).
98
Wolfe, supra note 1 , at 601-02.
99 See discussion supra Introduction.
100
Id. at 612. Example Four in the Introduction is based on the example in the
Wolfe article.
101
The most famous example of retroactive insurance was the policy purchased
by the MGM Grand Hotel following the catastrophic fire at their facility that killed
hundreds of people. A few months after the fire, after the company had been hit with
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Service has told the taxpayer that it plans to challenge some issues on
the taxpayer's return; only then does the taxpayer shift the risk of a
tax deficiency and penalties, along with the costs of a legal defense, to
the insurer. The premiums for retroactive insurance generally are
relatively high, since the probability of an adverse decision is
relatively high in comparison with that covered under a standard
liability insurance policy, where the loss event has not yet occurred.102
The same could be said of retroactive tax risk insurance. Retroactive
tax insurance is also more expensive than regular tax insurance
because with regular tax risk insurance the probability that the issue
being insured will be detected is less than one, whereas with
retroactive tax insurance the probability of detection is one.
As for the second general category of tax risk insurance,
quintessential tax transaction insurance, there are numerous
examples, many of which involve transactions that seek to gain the
benefit of either tax deferral through the application of specific
nonrecognition provisions or the avoidance of multiple layers of tax.
The first three examples in the Introduction would fit into this
category. In Example One, the taxpayer, an individual, is interested
in investing in an existing partnership, but her research reveals that
the partnership in question has a potential tax issue. 103 The taxpayer
could purchase a tax insurance policy to cover this risk. In Example
Three, the taxpayer is a corporation that wants to purchase a
subsidiary of a nearly insolvent parent company. When the taxpayer
discovers that the subsidiary has a potential tax issue, it worries that
there may be some successor tax liability in the event the case goes
badly, and it is concerned that the parent corporation might not have
sufficient assets, or might not even be around, to cover the potential
tax liability associated with the target company's prior actions. In that
situation, the purchasing company might decide to buy a tax
indemnity policy to shift all or some of the tax risk to an insurer,
rather than bear the risk itself. Numerous other examples include a
whole range of tax-related issues, many of which involve the
application of anti-avoidance standards to transactions whose
structure is at least partially influenced by tax considerations.
over 450 lawsuits but when the size of the ultimate liability was still greatly in
question, the owners of the property purchased a retroactive liability policy to cover
the loss. See David Lauter, MGM Cases Still Smoldering; Settlement Fund Reaches
$140M; Hotel Battles Insurers, NAT'L L.J., May 23, 1983, at 7.
1 02
MGM Grand paid $39 million in premiums for $170 million in retroactive
coverage. Id.
103
Wolfe, supra note 1, at 614-15.
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Probably the most highly publicized use of a tax insurance policy
to date involved a transaction similar to the one described in Example
Two in the Introduction. In 2001, the Georgia Pacific Company
wanted to split off its timber operations in a transaction that would
qualify for nontaxation under Code section 355. In the split-off
transaction, Georgia Pacific in effect planned to distribute its stock in
a wholly-owned subsidiary corporation which had substantially
appreciated in value to Georgia Pacific's shareholders, in exchange for
those shareholders' shares in Georgia Pacific. Without section 355,
such a transaction would produce two levels of income tax: (1) tax at
the corporate level to Georgia Pacific on what is effectively a sale of
its subsidiary to its shareholders, and (2) a tax to the shareholders on
the distribution of the shares in the subsidiary. Given the amount of
appreciation that can be present in such a subsidiary, the resulting tax
liability can be huge and would have been so in this case, large enough
in fact to make the transaction not worth doing. Under section 355,
however, if certain requirements are met, such split-off transactions
can be treated as a nontaxable event. The problem is that one of the
requirements is that the split-off be primarily motivated by a
substantial nontax "business purpose" and cannot be merely a
"device" for avoiding tax through a disguised dividend. The answer to
the business purpose question, however, requires a very fact-intensive,
ex post, standard-like inquiry. Although the Service had for years
provided such rulings in section 355 cases, in the Georgia Pacific case
the Service declined to do so, citing the heavily fact-intensive nature
of the inquiry. As a result, the parties to the transaction faced a large
amount of unanticipated tax-related legal uncertainty with respect to
the transaction. In response, Georgia Pacific opted to purchase a tax
insurance policy, with a policy limit of $500 million, to cover the
possible corporate level tax. With the insurance in place, the deal
then went through. After this highly-publicized transaction, the
Service announced that it would no longer provide advance rulings on
the business purpose part of proposed section 355 transactions. 104 The
Service stated that the issue was too fact-intensive and that, like other
such fact-intensive issues, would henceforth be resolved only on
examination. Thus, for section 355-related and many other types of
transactions, corporate taxpayers are left with the choice of forgoing
the transactions, going ahead with the transaction and bearing the risk
itself, or purchasing a tax indemnity policy. These are among the
costs of tax law uncertainty.
104

Rev. Proc. 2003-48, 2003-29 1.R.B. 86.
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B. The Function of Tax Insurance
This brings us to the asserted function and alleged social benefit
of tax risk insurance. Perhaps the best statement of the case is found
in the comments submitted by an official at The Hartford Insurance
Company in a written statement on proposed Treasury Regulations
that would have required any taxpayer purchasing a tax insurance
policy to treat the insured transaction as a "reportable transaction"
under Code section 6011. The statement bears quoting at length:
Tax insurance provides a needed alternative to the expenses,
limitations and uncertainties associated with private letter
ruling requests. Purchasers of tax insurance tend to be
conservative, highly risk-averse taxpayers (or their lenders or
investors) who choose to reduce or transfer even a modicum
of tax risk identified in their transactions in order to increase
certainty. Tax insurance was created due to a market need
for a financial product to facilitate extraordinary transactions
that may not otherwise close within the desired time frame
because of the uncertainty with respect to a tax issue. For
example, an auction bid typically cannot be contingent upon
or delayed until the receipt of a satisfactory private letter
ruling or pre-filing agreement.
Tax insurance is underwritten by or with the support of tax
attorneys who carefully review a transaction to "weed out"
weak tax positions and insure strong tax positions. In stark
contrast to certain tax practitioners (and promoters) who
generate fees by creative application of the Tax Code, tax
insurance underwriters are "rewarded" for providing a
conservative, prudent analysis of a proposed tax position.
Thus, tax insurance fills the "gap" caused by the cost,
limitations, uncertainties and delays associated with private
letter rulings . . . . Tax insurance allows customary commercial
transactions (albeit complex transactions) to proceed timely
and with certainty of the tax consequences.
Most
importantly, by refusing to insure tax shelters, abusive
schemes and weakly supported tax positions, the tax
insurance industry injects a distinctly conservative evaluation
within the community of tax professionals and helps to
cultivate a culture of compliance in which corporate tax
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shelters are less often created. 105
These statements were intended to ward off government
intervention in the tax insurance market and must therefore be taken
with a grain of salt. But they also contain the basis of what turns out
to be a pretty solid case in favor of allowing, and perhaps even
encouraging, the purchase of tax risk insurance. The argument goes
something like this: Notwithstanding the rule-based nature of the tax
laws, there remains significant legal uncertainty in how the tax laws
will be applied to many types of transactions. This uncertainty can
inhibit various types of transactions or can result in unfair and costly
risk-bearing, especially when taxpayers are for whatever reason highly
risk-averse with respect to tax deficiencies or tax penalties. For many
years, the normal source of tax law risk insurance has been the private
letter ruling issued by the Service with respect to particular
transactions. For whatever reasons, the Service is not able or willing
to provide rulings in a timely fashion for many types of tax law risks,
especially those that involve fact-intensive standard-like inquiries. 106
Insurance companies can fill this gap. Moreover, because insurance
companies have the resources to hire the very best tax lawyers in the
world to assist in the underwriting process, they can do a better job of
screening these transactions for excessively aggressive positions than
the Service can. If all of this is true, we have the makings of a case for
allowing or even encouraging the purchase tax risk insurance. So
what's the catch? The next section explores the main concerns with
tax risk insurance: the specter of tax shelter insurance.
C. The Concern About Tax Shelter Insurance: Deterrence Undermined
The problem with tax risk insurance is that it might be used to
insure, and thereby to encourage, overly aggressive tax positions. To
see this point, refer back to the tax-compliance continuum in Part IL
This continuum illustrates conceptually the range of possible tax
transactions for which an individual or corporate taxpayer might seek
to purchase tax risk insurance. On the far right, to the right of Point
B, there is no legal uncertainty. The taxpayer knows that it is entitled
105

See Insurance Group Comments, supra note 9.
The Service has a longstanding written policy of not issuing private letter
rulings for such fact intensive questions. For a complete and recent list of the areas in
which the Service states that it will not issue an advance ruling, see Rev. Proc. 2005-3,
2005-1 I.RB. 1 18 (covering domestic tax issues), and Rev. Proc. 2005-7, 2005-1 I.RB.
240 (covering international tax issues).
106
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to the tax treatment in question, and there is no need for private
insurance or a private letter ruling. On the far left, to the left of Point
A, are transactions that amount to outright tax evasion where the
taxpayer knows that the position being taken is illegal. For those
transactions, too, there is complete legal certainty, since the illegality
of the position is clear; there is only detection uncertainty uncertainty as to whether or not the position will be caught by the
Service. Although such transactions or such misuses of the tax code
are the most undesirable of all from a social perspective (hence the
criminal penalties), they are almost entirely irrelevant to the
discussion of tax risk insurance, as there is virtually no possibility that
any insurance company would ever insure such a transaction. Indeed,
every tax risk insurance policy that I have seen has contained an
exclusion for tax evasion. And although the policies do not provide a
comprehensive definition of the term "evasion," there is no doubt that
cases involving criminal penalties would be excluded. There is also
usually a separate exclusion for fraud, which would presumably
exclude coverage for tax cases involving civil fraud penalties. What is
even more important, no insurer would ever sell a policy without such
an exclusion. The reasons are simple. First, an insurance policy sold
to cover intentional wrongdoing would almost certainly be considered
unenforceable. 107 Second, the insurance company itself might be or
become subject to separate penalties for in effect aiding and abetting a
criminal activity. Third, and perhaps most important, no insurance
company would be willing to risk the bad publicity that insuring tax
evasion would bring. In sum, there is no serious concern that insurers
would ever sell what would be considered pure detection risk
insurance.
The problem is the range of tax positions represented by the
middle section of the tax compliance continuum between Points A
and B, with the most problematic area clustering around Point C.
More precisely, the real concern, from a tax enforcement perspective,
lies to the left (on the evasion side) of Point C. The reason Point C is
so important is that infinitesimally to the right of it is the important
more-likely-than-not threshold, the standard that must be satisfied in

107 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, 8 A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS § 19:20 (4th ed. 1998) ("It seems quite clear that the doctrine that
agreements to indemnify against negligence are valid should not be extended to
intentional misconduct or willful wrongdoing involving personal volition, such as, for
example, child molestation, or other intentional and inherently harmful activity.")
(footnotes omitted).
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order to acquire in effect an exemption from tax shelter penalties. 108
That is, if a tax advisor provides an opinion that characterizes the
taxpayer's position as being more likely than not to prevail on the
merits if examined, the odds are very good that no penalties will
ensue. More aggressive taxpayers and more aggressive tax advisors
may attempt to defend positions that are in some objective sense to
the left of Point C, on the belief that they can convince a judge, who is
often not a tax expert, that the more-likely-than-not threshold had
been met. Indeed, when we factor in the low probability of detection,
the relatively low penalties for tax understatements, the increased
market pressure on corporations to cut tax payments, and the general
sentiment that structuring one's affairs to minimize taxes is a public
right, the incentive for sophisticated taxpayers to push to the left of
Point B becomes very strong indeed. Moreover, for transactions that
do not qualify as tax shelters as defined by the Code, the relevant
standard is to the left of C, since avoidance of penalties for substantial
tax understatements for nonshelters requires only "substantial
authority," which is something less than a fifty-plus percent chance of
prevailing on the merits. Because of this lower standard, taxpayers
presumably have an incentive to claim that their transactions are not
shelters - that they do not have a "significant purpose" of avoiding
or evading federal taxation - although for the most egregious
shelters this strategy would be risky. Still, this phenomenon may tend
to push some taxpayers to take positions even further to the left of
Point C. For all of these reasons, an argument can be made that more
and more taxpayers are choosing to take tax positions that lie to the
left of Point C and closer to what might rightly be called tax evasion,
where there is little substantive legal uncertainty (i.e., the positions
will almost certainly be shot down if detected), and the only
uncertainty is whether the taxpayers will be caught. Indeed, this is
one way of restating the tax shelter phenomenon.
Now introduce tax risk insurance into the picture. It is one thing
to allow taxpayers to insure substantive legal uncertainty, when it is
anyone's guess how the law will be applied to a given transaction. But
it is quite another to allow them to insure pure detection risk, when
the position is probably illegal, in the sense that a court would likely
reject it as being inconsistent with a reasonable interpretation of the
Code, and the only uncertainty is whether the Service will catch them.
If tax indemnity insurance was allowed for highly aggressive tax
shelters, and Congress and Treasury did nothing about it, the
108

See supra text accompanying notes 38-39.
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deterrence consequences could be profound. Those taxpayers who
were considering whether or not to engage in an aggressive shelter but
who were marginally deterred by the risk of tax penalties might be
induced by the presence of tax shelter insurance to take the plunge.
Or those already inclined to engage in such transactions may decide to
increase the scope or aggressiveness of the shelter transactions, if part
of the risk could be shifted to a third-party insurers. It is unrealistic,
of course, to assume that lawmakers would not respond to this
possibility. Thus, if tax shelter insurance began to be sold, lawmakers
might simply increase dramatically the financial penalties for "abusive
tax shelters," which would presumably be reflected in tax insurance
premiums, thus maintaining the deterrence effect that existed without
the insurance. The main problem with that approach, besides the
apparent political difficulty Congress experiences in raising tax
compliance penalties generally, is that even if it adopted higher shelter
penalties, they might be considered unfairly punitive for uninsured
taxpayers. That problem could be addressed in tum by imposing
special, higher penalties for those with shelter insurance, but then we
have gone a considerable way toward banning the practice altogether.
Alternatively, or in addition, the Treasury Department might shift
away from using financial penalties, which would increasingly be
insured, and toward uninsurable nonmonetary sanctions such as stiffer
jail sentences. The problem with that response, however, is that jail
time may not always be a good substitute for monetary penalties, and
the use of nonmonetary sanctions may also suffer from
proportionality problems. The upshot of all of this is that, in a world
with tax shelter insurance, it is certainly possible that the deterrence
value of monetary penalties would be reduced and that, as a result,
shelter activity would increase.
In fact, for all of these reasons, everyone seems to agree that the
sale of tax shelter insurance would be a bad thing. Even those who
sell or promote tax insurance policies agree with that conclusion.
Moreover, if tax insurance policies were currently being sold to cover
pure detection risk, the risk created by the most egregious and
indefensible shelter transactions, everyone would agree that some
measure of regulatory intervention by the government would be
warranted. How likely is it, however, that insurers would ever sell tax
shelter coverage? We have already noted that they would never sell
tax-evasion insurance, as it would be unenforceable and risky. What
about tax shelters, however? In their promotional materials, tax
insurers state emphatically that they do not insure tax shelters, which
at least one such insurer defines in its promotional materials as
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transactions "for the principal purpose of obtaining a tax advantage."
These statements could be pure propaganda disseminated for the
benefit of tax and insurance regulators.
Moreover, there is
considerable wiggle room in the term "principal purpose." However,
the policies that I have seen do not cover tax transactions that fit the
mold of the quintessentially abusive corporate tax shelter of the sort
that has received attention recently in the tax and general business
press and that has led to a regulatory crackdown. To the contrary,
with the transactions that are currently being insured, although there
is obviously an element of merits risk or legal uncertainty that could
be a substantial concern for risk-averse taxpayers, the probability of
winning on the merits is not so low as to call into question the good
faith of the taxpayers. For example, consider. the run-of-the-mill
section 355 split-off transaction, similar to the one described above.
Although there is clearly some risk that such a transaction could be
disallowed by the Service under an existing anti-avoidance principle
- such as the business purpose requirement - even the tax shelter
police would have to admit that such cases present genuine legal
uncertainty or significant merits risk. Moreover, because such
transactions are identified on the taxpayers' returns and are generally
well publicized within financial circles, the detection risk for such
transactions is quite high. The same could be said of many of the
corporate reorganization transactions, such as those under Code
section 368, that have become the bread and butter work of corporate
tax lawyers and that despite presenting some prospect of disallowance
- indeed, if there were no such prospect, the tax lawyers would not
be needed - are not particularly aggressive tax plays. These
transactions too are now being insured. Moreover, there are many
other routine corporate acquisition and merger transactions being
insured that do not involve the sorts of transactions that are of
greatest concern to the Treasury Department. Certainly none of the
examples of transactions that have been reported as being insured are
transactions, or are substantially similar to those transactions, that
appear on the Service's official list of targeted shelter transactions. 109
In addition, as discussed above, at least some of the tax risk policies
seem to involve virtually no uncertainty as to detection, and thus only
merits risk or substantive legal uncertainty, as the insurance is
purchased after a ruling request has been submitted to the Service,
109 The Service's most recent list of abusive tax shelters and transactions can be
found online at Internal Revenue Service, Listed Abusive Tax Shelters and
Transactions, http://www.irs.gov/businesses/corporations/article/O,,id=120633,00.html
(last visited Sept. 17, 2005).
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and hence after the probability of detection on audit has been
increased to one.
Even if many of the tax transaction insurance policies written
today cover legitimate substantive legal uncertainty - and these are
the policies that insurers advertise to the public - it is possible that
insurance policies covering more aggressive tax positions are being
sold in secret, perhaps protected by confidentiality agreements.
Alternatively, even if tax shelter insurance policies are not currently
being offered, over time the competitive pressure could lead more
aggressive insurers to begin covering more aggressive tax positions.
So, what should be done about it? Should we ban such policies? That
would throw the baby out with the bath water, since over-compliance
with the tax laws as a result of substantive legal uncertainty can in
theory be as much a source of wasteful distortion and unfair allocation
as can under-compliance. Should we instead regulate privately
provided tax risk insurance? Alternatively, should we expand the
circumstances under which the Service will provide private letter
rulings, thereby eliminating the need and the demand for private tax
risk insurance? The next Part considers these and related questions.
V.

REGULATORY RESPONSES TO TAX RISK INSURANCE

A. Compulsory Disclosure, Ex Post Penalties, and the Contrast with
Tax Advisor Warranties
If regulators are concerned about tax transaction insurance
morphing into tax shelter insurance, perhaps the simplest and most
obvious regulatory solution would be compulsory disclosure, to
require taxpayers who purchase tax indemnity insurance to disclose
this fact to the Service, perhaps by attaching a copy of the insurance
policy to their tax returns. Such a requirement (a) would reduce the
possibility that the insurance was being sold for aggressive tax shelter
positions - that is, being sold to cover pure detection risk, and (b )
would allow the use of such policies to cover legitimate legal
uncertainty. The benefit of including the policy with the tax return is
that the policies themselves typically contain a detailed description of
the tax position being insured. Indeed, such a detailed description is
essential to the insurer's ability to underwrite the policy, because the
insurer must carefully circumscribe the nature of the transaction it is
covering in order to minimize moral hazard on the part of the
taxpayer - which here would mean the taxpayer is taking a more
aggressive position than the insurer agreed to cover. Hence, the
policy itself must spell out the precise nature of the transaction being
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insured. If the policy is then attached to the taxpayer's return and the
Service, upon reviewing the policy, determined that the return in
question - especially the insured tax position - warranted auditing,
they could do so. Compulsory disclosure therefore would largely
eliminate the possibility that tax insurance would be sold for pure
detection risk.
Interestingly, the compulsory disclosure idea was recently
considered by the Treasury Department and was even included in one
version of the Treasury Department's temporary regulations
governing so-called "reportable" transactions.
Under those
temporary regulations, the purchase of tax indemnity insurance was to
trigger a filing requirement, although not a requirement to attach the
policy. Rather, the taxpayer who purchased a tax insurance policy
would have been required to file the standard "Disclosure Statement
for Reportable Transaction" used for all reportable transactions. 110
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the insurance industry objected to the
proposal, arguing that this reporting requirement would have a
"chilling effect" on the tax insurance industry and thereby harm the
economy, as on their view tax insurance was becoming a useful
substitute for advance letter rulings and was thus important to
continued mergers and acquisitions activity. 111 They argued further
that tax insurance was not being sold for shelter transactions, was only
being sold to taxpayers who were concerned about substantive legal
uncertainty, and had the effect of improving tax compliance because
only the most conservative tax positions would survive the insurers'
underwriting processes.
Although these arguments are obviously self-serving, they do
have some merit, as I will explain. For now, it is worth noting that
part of the risk currently being insured under tax risk policies is audit
risk or detection risk. That is to say, when insurers currently sell tax
risk insurance, they almost certainly price their policies to account for
the possibility that the tax issue being insured will never be detected
110
111

See Temp. Treas. Reg. § l .6011 -4T(b)(4) (2000).
In particular, Dave De Berry of The Hartford testified as follows:

The Hartford, together with all other carriers that provide tax insurance,
opposes the proliferation of corporate tax shelters and abusive tax
avoidance schemes. Sound underwriting practices by insurance carriers and
their respective reinsurance carriers precludes coverage for tax shelters or
abusive tax avoidance schemes, as well as legitimate positions that seem to
be only weakly supported by the facts . . . .
Insurance Group Comments, supra note 9, CJ[ 9.
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by the Service. They would be crazy not to do so, given the
competitive nature of the insurance business. If an insurer considered
only merits risk and in effect assumed that the issue being insured
would be litigated, the premium the insurer would have to charge
would be high - perhaps very high - relative to the premium that
could be charged if detection risk (i.e., the possibility of avoiding
detection) were factored in. Therefore, any insurer that ignored the
possibility that the issue would go undetected would lose out in the
competition for insureds, as another insurer could easily come along
and under-price the first insurer for essentially the same product.
Knowing this fact, insurers will be induced by competition to factor
the chance of avoiding detection into their premiums. This conclusion
assumes, however, that the Service does not require the policies to be
disclosed when the return is filed. If disclosure is required, premiums
would have to rise to reflect the . increased probability of detection.
The higher premiums would presumably deter some taxpayers from
purchasing a tax insurance policy in the first place. This sort of direct
chilling effect, however, is entirely for the good. Put differently, the
chilling effect associated with increased prices due to increased
probability of detection would deter precisely the types of tax
insurance transactions that are of greatest concern. If after the
adoption of a reporting requirement the tax insurance market were to
dry up completely as a result of this effect, and insurers and taxpayers
were not able to negotiate policies in ways that made them profitable
for both sides, such an outcome would provide fairly convincing
evidence that these products are providing more coverage for
detection uncertainty than substantive legal uncertainty and are
probably best eliminated. 112
This is not to say, however, that the chilling effect argument is
wholly without merit. Compulsory disclosure may raise the cost of tax
risk insurance even for those policies covering primarily substantive
legal risk. This could happen, for example, if the taxpayer's disclosure
of a tax insurance policy were to trigger or significantly increase the
likelihood of triggering an audit by the Service of the taxpayer's entire
return and not merely the single transaction being insured. Imagine
that the Service were of the view that taxpayers who purchase tax
insurance tended on average to be more aggressive on their returns
112

Indeed, some skeptics have suggested to me that there really is very little
substantive legal uncertainty involved in the types of tax planning transactions that
are currently being insured, thus implying that what is being insured is primarily
detection risk. If that is so, then a disclosure requirement will likely cause the market
for such insurance to disappear.
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generally. If so, the Service might treat tax insurance as a proxy for
overall aggressiveness and subject such taxpayers to increased scrutiny
across the board. Were that to happen, it would be akin to placing an
excise tax on the purchase of tax insurance, but worse - since it
would be an uncertain tax, inasmuch as the likely outcome and cost of
such increased scrutiny would be uncertain. The result at the margins
would be that some taxpayers would be priced out of the market, and,
at the extreme, the market for tax insurance might collapse entirely.
What is more, even if the Service were to limit its increased scrutiny to
the specific transactions being insured, on the speculation that those
are likely to involve aggressive tax positions, that too would raise the
cost of tax insurance and perhaps inhibit the market's development.
Assuming the Service is wrong that the purchase of tax insurance
indicates a greater propensity for tax aggressiveness and wrong that
the transactions being insured are themselves especially aggressive,
this would be a bad result: a social-welfare-enhancing product would
be forced off the market. This might be thought of as an indirect
chilling effect of a compulsory disclosure requirement. How likely is
it to happen? If tax insurance companies behave as they claim to,
engaging in careful underwriting to make sure that the only tax
positions they insure are ones that have a strong likelihood of
succeeding on the merits, then the purchase of tax insurance need not
signal hyper-aggressiveness in any respect. To the contrary, it may
develop into a signal of tax-planning conservatism if some insurers
over time can establish a reputation for only insuring fairly
conservative positions. The real chilling effect problem, however,
occurs in the short run, before the insurers have had a chance to prove
themselves and when the Service may well be tempted justifiably to
increase audit rates of insured returns, at least for a while. A possible
solution to this problem would be to provide a modest and perhaps
temporary subsidy to defray the extra costs of purchasing tax
insurance caused by increased audit rates.
Compulsory reporting of tax transaction insurance raises other
issues as well. For example, without stiff penalties for nonreporting,
the incentive to report may be too low. Of course, if failure to report
a tax insurance contract were made punishable by a criminal or stiff
civil penalty, this problem could be substantially reduced. The other
problem with the reporting solution is that, when a category of
transactions is required to be reported in this way, taxpayers can
sometimes construe the requirement so broadly, sometimes
intentionally, as to deluge the Service with an avalanche of paper.
That is, there could be such a large increase in information being
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reported that the Service would be overwhelmed and could not
separate the wheat from the chaff. If that were to happen, then the
reporting response would not be helpful. Although the information
avalanche scenario seems highly unlikely at present, given the small
size of the tax risk insurance market, if the use of these policies were
to expand considerably, the problem could be significant. The
problem is not just that the Service may be overwhelmed, but also that
the administrative reporting costs imposed on taxpayers would be
increased. An alternative to compulsory reporting would be to do
nothing for now and to wait and see what happens, which seems to be
the path chosen by the government. If it turns out that some
insurance companies are writing policies for highly or even marginally
aggressive positions, action could be taken against that particular
insurer and its clients. Penalties could be imposed on insurers who are
found to have sold insurance for tax shelter positions. Those insurers
could be required to disclose their clients to the Service, who would
then be subject to a new and especially searching audit process and
ultimately increased penalties as well.
Also, if the Treasury
Department determines that some categories of overly aggressive
positions are being insured, a list of "uninsurable positions" could be
promulgated, akin to the "listed transactions" category, positions that
if insured would give rise to a special penalty for taxpayers and
insurers alike. This approach would have the benefit of deterring tax
shelter insurance without subjecting the policies covering true
substantive legal uncertainty to any special penalties. Of course, with
this approach, and especially without compulsory disclosure, there
would always be the possibility that the aggressive taxpayer-insurer
collaborations might escape detection. But that is the sort of
possibility that again can be handled by increasing penalties ex post.
To date, the insurance industry has persuaded the Treasury
Department that tax insurance is not a problem that warrants
regulatory intervention.
Thus, under the current reportable
transaction regulations, the purchase of tax insurance does not trigger
a reporting requirement; there are no special penalties for tax insurers
who insure tax shelter transactions. 113 It is interesting to note,
however, that other forms of "contractual protection" - such as
money-back warranties provided by tax advisors - do trigger the
reporting requirement. Thus, as discussed at the end of Part III
above, if the insurance is provided by the tax advisor rather than by a
separate insurance company and if the insurance is limited to a refund
113

Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4 (2004).
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of fees in the event that the tax position in question is rejected, then
the taxpayer must flag the transaction for the Service. 114 The
exception to this rule is when the tax advice being given, and the
money-back guarantee being provided, involves a claim for refund
based on a return that was already filed prior to any fees being
charged. Obviously, then, the concern here is that such guarantees or
contingent fee arrangements will be used to cover mostly detection
risk (i.e., aggressive shelter opinions), except in cases involving refund
claims, where the probability of detection is significantly greater,
though not necessarily equal to one. The interesting question is why
this concern about detection risk or shelter insurance would be
greater for tax advisor warranties and contingent fee arrangements
than for tax insurance policies. The answer to this question might
shed some light on what, if anything, should be done about tax
transaction insurance.
The main differences between tax transaction insurance and tax
advisor warranties are the involvement of insurance companies and
the concomitant triggering of the states' insurance regulatory regimes.
Insurance companies are notoriously conservative in their
underwriting practices and must satisfy various regulatory reporting
requirements that tax advisors need not satisfy. Moreover, whereas
tax advisor warranties, which are generally oral and informal in
nature, probably are not subject to the sort of public policy
restrictions that would apply to formal, written insurance policies.
Hence, one external regulatory force that would inhibit both the
demand for and the supply of insurance policies for increasingly
aggressive tax plays would be the possibility that such contracts might
be deemed void as against public policy. Although it seems
unthinkable that an insurance company would invoke this doctrine to
avoid paying under such a policy, it is possible that an aggressive state
regulator, insurance commissioner, or attorney general might make
such a ruling. In addition, from what I am told, current demand for
tax transaction insurance is being met by only a small number of large
insurance companies. Given this fact, if a particular insurer decided to
offer policies for aggressive tax shelter transactions and this were
discovered, the Treasury Department could then take action against
the aggressive insurer, in much the same way that it has already done
with tax shelter promoters. The threat of such a possibility likely
would deter insurers from overstepping the line. By contrast, in the
absence of an official reporting requirement for other types of
114

See supra note 87.
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contractual protection, presumably including tax advisor warranties, it
seems unlikely that they would ever be discovered or made public.
One can certainly imagine some especially aggressive tax advisors
being willing to play the audit lottery along with their clients, whereas
that possibility seems rather unlikely with insurance companies.
What is my bottom line? Is current Treasury policy fine as it is, or
should more be done to reduce the risk of tax shelter insurance? It is
difficult to offer a definitive answer to these questions, given that the
dangers that tax insurance presents, if any, depend on the larger
context of tax enforcement policy. Thus, if tax shelter activity was
already adequately deterred by a combination of aggressive Service
auditing and stiff penalties for tax underpayments - and I mean
much stiffer than is currently the case - tax insurance policies as well
as tax advisor warranties would likely be a nonissue. Either the
detection risk would be high, meaning the insurance would cover only
substantive legal uncertainty, or the penalties would be so high that
the result would be the same. In the current regulatory climate,
however, a climate in which audit rates are low, the Service staff is
outgunned by highly paid tax advisors, and tax penalties are far below
levels necessary to achieve optimal deterrence, some modest
regulatory action would seem appropriate. Thus, the compulsory
disclosure option mentioned above strikes me as a sensible step.
Although the distinction the Treasury has drawn between private
contractual-protection agreements and insurance policies is
defensible, I am unpersuaded. That is, I would probably require
taxpayers to disclose their purchase of tax insurance in the manner
described above, although I would try to find some way to offset the
cost of this disclosure in order to minimize the indirect chilling effect.
Given the nature of the tax transaction policies currently being sold, it
is highly doubtful that the market would be much affected by a
disclosure requirement. Indeed, it could even be helped, as the public
and the Service would be made aware of the nature of the policies and
the types of transactions being insured. Furthermore, because of this
publicity effect, it is conceivable that compulsory disclosure could
ultimately lead to more corporate and wealthy individual taxpayers
trying it. Assuming the Service has the resources to review all of these
insurance policies and the transactions being insured by them, the
spread of tax risk insurance would not necessarily be a bad outcome.
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B. Private Versus Public Insurance for Tax Law Uncertainty
Before we can conclude definitively that a private market in tax
risk insurance is a good thing, however, we must return to the
comparison between private tax insurance and its most obvious
alternative, government provided tax law uncertainty insurance.
Given the reasonable assumption that Congress cannot possibly enact
tax laws that cover every conceivable transaction in advance, there
will always be some residual substantive tax law uncertainty. The
primary means in the past of dealing with this uncertainty for risk
averse taxpayers has always been the private letter ruling. In general,
if a taxpayer follows certain technical filing procedures, the Service
will issue a ruling directly to the taxpayer that explains how it will
apply the law to the particular transaction described in the ruling
request. 115 The Service will issue rulings on both proposed and
completed transactions, assuming no return has yet been filed and the
ruling-request procedures have been followed. 116 If a favorable ruling
is issued by the Service, the taxpayer may generally rely upon it. 117 In
that sense, then, a favorable letter ruling is akin to purchasing tax law
uncertainty insurance from the government. Private letter rulings can
be revoked retroactively under certain conditions, which also is
similar to an insurance policy that can be rendered void if certain
exclusions are triggered. For example, this could occur if the Service
determines that the taxpayer misstated an important fact in its ruling
request or determines that the factual circumstance of the transaction
has changed dramatically from the facts that prevailed at the time of
the request. That possibility is analogous to the exclusion in most
insurance policies that eliminates coverage if the insured commits
fraud or makes any materially misleading statement in the insurance
application process. Private letter rulings can also be revoked by the
issuance of a revenue ruling, the promulgation of final regulations, the
enactment of federal legislation, or a decision of the U.S. Supreme
Court that is directly on point.118 This possibility is akin to the
115

The procedures for filing a ruling request are contained and updated in the
first revenue procedure issued by the Service each year. See, e.g. , Rev. Proc. 2005-1,
2005-1 l.R.B. 1.
116
See id. § 5.01.
117
See id. § 11. Private letter rulings have no precedential value for other
taxpayers. Taxpayers, however, will sometimes look to them as evidence of how the
Service might handle particular issues that have not yet been addressed in more
formal announcements, such as in a Revenue Ruling.
11s
Id.
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exclusion in tax risk insurance policies for changes in the law. If the
taxpayer seeking a letter ruling wants even greater certainty from the
government regarding the tax treatment of a particular transaction, he
or she can enter into a "closing agreement" with the Service, which
conclusively determines the issue in question and is binding on the
Service unless there is fraud or material misstatement on the part of
the taxpayer. 119 The additional level of "coverage" provided by the
closing agreement effectively eliminates the risk of retroactive
revocation by revenue ruling, regulation, or congressional action,
although the fraud and misrepresentation limitations remain. Of
course, the Service does not charge a premium for this insurance in
the same way that an insurance company does. It charges a nominal
fee, and the taxpayer must incur the cost of hiring a lawyer to draft the
ruling request, but the taxpayer is not required to make a payment to
the government that approximates the expected value of the
taxpayer's tax liability, as there is with private tax risk insurance.
An important question is why the private-letter-ruling process is
not itself sufficient to meet taxpayers' need for tax law uncertainty
insurance. If taxpayers are so concerned about the uncertainty of how
the tax laws will be applied, why do they not simply apply for a ruling?
This is what is done in other areas of law. 120 As already noted, there
are a number of circumstances in which the Service will not issue

119

Id. § 2.02.
In other areas of law where there is similar transaction-specific or activity
specific legal uncertainty, individuals or corporations that are concerned about such
uncertainty can request that the regulators render an opinion as to how the law would
apply to a particular set of facts. For example, the Securities and Exchange
Commission ( SEC) upon request will issue so-called no action letters indicating that
no criminal or civil action will be taken against the person engaged in a particular
activity. The letters, typically issued from a particular division within the SEC,
usually state that the division "will not recommend enforcement action," with the
following qualification:
120

This position is based on the representations made to the Division in your
letter. Any different facts or conditions might require the Division to reach
a different conclusion. Further, this response only represents the Division's
position on enforcement and does not purport to express any legal
conclusion on the question presented.
Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, No Action, Interpretive and/or Exemptive Letter: Insilco
Holding Co., http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/insilco031803.htm (last
visited Sept. 17, 2005 ) ; see also Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Staff No Action, Interpretive
and Exemptive Letters, http://www.sec.gov/interps/noaction.shtml (last visited Sept.
17, 2005 ) .
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.
121
rulmgs.
Among them are whether a propose d or completed
transaction "lack[s] a bona fide business purpose" or has as its
"principal purpose the reduction of federal taxes." In addition, the
Service states that it will not "ordinarily" issue rulings (a) on " [a]ny
matter in which the determination requested is primarily one of
fact . . . [such as] whether an interest in a corporation is to be treated
as stock or indebtedness," (b) in "[ s]ituations where the requested
ruling deals with only part of an integrated transaction," and (c) on
issues that are "under [extensive] study" by the Service. 122
Unfortunately, these are categories that could be construed to cover
many transactions, and they are types of transactions that often
involve the highest degree of legal uncertainty.
Perhaps
unsurprisingly, then, they are transactions for which private insurance
has recently become available. The question now becomes why the
Service is not willing to provide rulings under circumstances of
profound substantive legal uncertainty - such as ones that involve
the application of anti-avoidance standards - and why private
insurers are willing to insure such transactions. As it turns out, there
are a number of possible explanations. 123
Continuing the insurance analogy, one conceivable answer is that
the Service simply does not have the resources to "underwrite" the
risks. That is, they do not have a large enough or sufficiently capable
staff to do the factual and legal analysis necessary to issue rulings on
such fact-intensive questions without running a big risk of adverse
selection and moral hazard. 124 That is, if the Service were to issue
rulings on such questions as whether there is a sufficient nontax
business purpose in a particular transaction, or whether there was
economic substance without having done a thorough and detailed
analysis of all the relevant facts and law, there would be a tendency
for relatively aggressive taxpayers to apply for such rulings.
Moreover, because once a ruling is issued it is difficult for the Service
to determine if it should be retroactively revoked - for example,
because the actual transaction does not coincide with the described
transaction - taxpayers who have secured an advance ruling have an
121

See Rev. Proc. 2005-3, 2005-1 I.RB. 118. The list of issues on which the
Service will never or will not "ordinarily" give letter rulings is updated in the third
revenue procedure of each year.
122
Id.
123
I do not know if there is a similar list of issues about which the SEC will not
issue no action letters.
124
Underwriting is the process by which insurers determine whether a particular
risk is insurable and, if so, under what contractual terms.
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incentive subtly to alter the transactions so as to increase their tax
avoidance aspect. Of course, the Service is not without some defense
mechanisms in dealing with this sort of adverse selection and moral
hazard. The Service, as mentioned, does have the authority to revoke
a ruling after-the-fact if it can show that there were demonstrable
misstatements in the ruling request. Such misstatements, however,
may be difficult to identify, much less prove; in any event, issuing such
a retroactive revocation may be administratively and politically costly.
Thus, because of the difficulty of combating such adverse selection
and moral hazard on the part of taxpayers, the Service may have
determined that it makes more sense for the agency simply to
withdraw from providing this type of insurance coverage, just as
private insurance companies sometimes temporarily or permanently
withdraw from offering certain types of insurance coverage.
Yet private insurers seem to be willing to fill in some of the gaps
in tax uncertainty insurance. Why? First, we should not forget that
the reason may be that insurers are to some extent selling detection
risk insurance, which the Service obviously has no interest in doing
and which we want to discourage - hence the proposal to require
disclosure of the tax risk policies. Putting that possibility to one side,
which seems reasonable for many of the sorts of transactions currently
being insured, perhaps the reason is that private insurers are better
funded and better organized than the Service and have better access
to exceptionally able tax lawyers to advise them on these issues. 125 At
least some of the largest insurance companies selling tax indemnity
insurance policies, as a regular part of their tax insurance underwriting
process, consult a panel of the very best tax lawyers in the business.
That is, they use expert advisory panels to help them determine if
particular transactions are likely to be rejected or approved by the
Service on audit or more importantly by a court in litigation. In this
way, perhaps private insurance companies are simply better at doing
ex ante tax transaction risk assessments, which might be thought of as
ex ante "mini-audits," than is the government.
If the problem is merely the low quantity and quality of the
Service's tax lawyers, something could be done about it. Congress
125

The conventional wisdom among tax practitioners is that Service lawyers are
in over their heads or "out of their league" at least when it comes to dealing with
complex tax shelters. Bankman, supra note 7, at 1786 ("A persistent comment of
private attorneys, speaking in their public-spirited capacity, is the inability of the
[Service] field staff to correctly apply many of the more complicated tax provisions.
Many private attorneys believe that auditors are completely out of their league in
identifying and correctly analyzing tax shelter items.").
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could simply allocate more money to the Service for hiring attorneys,
whether they are brought in-house or hired on a contract basis. That
may well be a good idea. It is possible, in other words, that if
Congress were to increase the Service's budget dramatically, ear
marking money to hire more and better lawyers in the Service's Chief
Counsel's and Deputy Chief Counsel's offices, more private letter
rulings would be forthcoming - that is, the Service might agree to
issue rulings in areas of higher legal uncertainty such as those
involving the application of fact-intensive anti-avoidance standards and hence fewer taxpayers would see a need for private tax indemnity
insurance. Moreover, if we added more and better lawyers to the field
offices doing the audits, the rate of detection for tax shelter
transactions might be dramatically increased, which would reduce
some of our concerns about tax shelter insurance. If adding talented
personnel were feasible, then it may be an improvement over the
current state of affairs. We should note, however, that insofar as we
conceive of the private letter ruling process as a form of government
provided insurance, it has some of the problems and it lacks some of
the benefits that we sometimes see with government provided
insurance. One problem, which is found in most forms of government
provided insurance, is that the government makes no attempt to
charge a true premium to the taxpayer-insured, one that roughly
reflects the risk being shifted to the government. Not charging a risk
adjusted premium further increases the chance of adverse selection of
the sort described above. 126
Sometimes government provided
126

Having the Service charge a risk-adjusted premium for issuing an advance
ruling is not an entirely crazy idea. Whenever the Service settles a tax case and enters
into a closing agreement, they are in a sense accepting a payment equal to something
approximating the expected value of the taxpayer's liability. Of course, this is not the
same thing as, in effect, settling a case before there is a dispute, and doing so on a
large scale. Even that is not without precedent in the tax area, as the Service already
has a program for entering into so-called advanced pricing agreements with
multinational corporations who are concerned about the uncertainty with respect to
how the Service might resolve transfer-pricing issues, which themselves raise an
especially fact-intensive set of questions. These advance agreements are a form of
alternative dispute resolution under which the taxpayers or taxpayer groups avoid ex
post audits of their transfer prices, and potentially large adjustments, by agreeing in
advance to use a standard arms-length pricing method. I.RS. Announcement 200527, 2005-16 I.RB. 918 (statement by Matthew W. Franks, director of the Advance
Pricing Agreement Program, explaining how the program works). Whether this
system is working as it is supposed to for transfer-pricing issues is beyond the scope of
this analysis. Whether a similar approach might be used more generally for other
highly fact-intensive questions of income tax law, especially those involving
corporations and partnerships, seems unlikely, at least any time soon. To undertake
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insurance is able to combat adverse selection, in a way that private
insurance cannot, by making coverage compulsory. Obviously,
private letter rulings are entirely elective. For all these reasons, the
adverse selection effect - of aggressive taxpayers trying to take
advantage of under-priced and elective government-provided tax
uncertainty insurance - may simply be too much to overcome.
Nonetheless, the idea of increasing the Service's funding to allow
it to hire more and better-qualified personnel for conducting analyses
of ruling requests - and perhaps helping to fund these new personnel
by significantly increasing the fe es that are charged, even if the fees
are not linked to expected tax liability - might be worth trying. We
might even consider allowing the Service to use outside tax experts to
assist them, as insurers have done. 127 Having said all of this, however,
I still see no sound reason to object to a market in privately provided
tax risk insurance for those domains of tax law uncertainty that
insurers are willing to enter. Insurance companies are especially
adept at combating adverse selection and moral hazard problems.
Their use of detailed insurance application procedures, expert
advisory panels, and the deductibles, policy limits, and numerous
exclusions in their policies are evidence of this fact. Moreover, having
private insurers cover these risks provides another advantage over
government-provided insurance: the private insurers can also provide
coverage for legal fees, which is no small part of the legal risk being
insured and which the government cannot reasonably insure. The
reason the government cannot cover the legal fees is the issue of
conflict of interest: the government as insurer could not be responsible
for hiring and supervising the taxpayers' attorneys in the tax dispute.
The insurer, however, can. 128

such a project on a broader scale would require far more administrative resources
than the Service has or ever is likely to have.
127
Other commentators have suggested that allowing the Service to retain elite
tax lawyers on a contract basis to assist with complex tax shelter cases may be a
useful, though politically unlikely, response to the problem of Service understaffing.
See, e.g. , Bankman, supra note 7, at 1787 ("In theory, the government could contract
with private parties on an incentive-based fee structure to ferret out shelter activity.
A related . . . proposal would be to hire outside experts on a non-incentive based fee
arrangement to train auditors and, perhaps, advise on particular audits or audit
related issues.").
128
There can be conflicts of interest between private insurers and the insured as
well, especially in settlement negotiations, but these can usually be handled
contractually or by application of state-law good faith standards and rules of
professional ethics for lawyers.
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CONCLUSION

Despite the extraordinary length and specificity of the federal tax
laws, many sophisticated taxpayers face uncertainty as to how their
transactions will be treated by the Service and the courts. That is,
although the Code is the quintessential rule-based system of law, as
opposed to one that relies primarily on vague standards, there remain
significant areas of legal uncertainty even for those taxpayers able to
hire tax law experts. The reasons for this are simple enough. First,
there are a seemingly infinite variety of transactions that taxpayers
can enter, and the tax laws cannot deal clearly with all of them in
advance. There will always be gaps and inconsistencies in the tax
laws. Second, because of these inevitable gaps, the taxing authorities
will have a strong incentive to use some type of background anti
avoidance standards - such as the business purpose or economic
substance standards - to prevent abusive tax avoidance. Both of
these facts combine to create significant legal uncertainty for the
sophisticated taxpayer. Such uncertainty can lead to distortions in
economic activity and is not ideal from a social welfare perspective,
even though it can serve as a sort of second-best deterrent against
excessively aggressive tax avoidance.
The better response to tax law uncertainty is (a) to increase
penalties or the likelihood of detection to deter abusive tax positions
and (b) to make available some form of tax law uncertainty insurance.
Until recently, the only available insurance for this sort of uncertainty
was the private letter ruling, which serves only a very small portion of
taxpayers and is explicitly not available, probably for adverse
selection and moral hazard reasons, for those transactions that involve
the most legal uncertainty - the ones that involve highly fact specific
standards-like analyses. A new market of private insurance has arisen
to cover this category of legal uncertainty, and the question is whether
it is a bad or a good thing. The concern is that such insurance will not
be sold to cover positions about which there is legitimate legal
uncertainty, but for positions that are more likely than not to be
rejected by the Service and the courts if examined. For those
positions, tax insurance would be, in effect, audit or detection
insurance; that would be bad. To prevent this possibility, while at the
same time allowing the benefits of a private market in tax law
uncertainty insurance, the Treasury Department probably should
compel taxpayers who purchase tax risk insurance from a private
insurer to disclose that fact on their return. This will doubtless raise
the cost of such insurance and may in the short run hinder the
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development of the market. In the long run, however, if there is
strong demand for tax law uncertainty insurance - not just for
detection-risk insurance - the market should survive and grow.
Indeed, given the potential efficiency gains from the use of legitimate
tax law uncertainty insurance, the government should consider ways
of subsidizing it, at least in the short run. Privately provided tax risk
insurance not only allows risk-averse taxpayers to shift this
uncertainty from themselves to risk-neutral insurers, it creates an
incentive for insurers - and their paid expert tax advisors - to serve
as a sort of privatized Service. By doing ex ante mini-audits in the
form of tax risk underwriting, insurers can fill a void that the Service,
through its letter ruling policies, is unwilling and probably unable to
fill.

